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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is a collection of three essays in corporate finance and bond interest 
rate volatility. Chapter 1 investigates the impact of TARP preferred stock on two 
different types of outstanding preferred stock. The October 14, 2008 TARP program 
mandated a forced issuance of TARP preferred stock by the largest U.S. banks. Soon 
after, many smaller banks were not forced but chose to issue TARP preferred stock 
after being approved for issuance. We investigate the impact of TARP preferred on 
two different types of outstanding preferred stock. These two different types of 
preferred stock are (1) trust preferred stock, which is senior to TARP preferred stock, 
and (2) non-trust preferred stock, which has equal claim to TARP preferred stock. 
We present competing theories for expecting that trust preferred should enjoy greater 
or lesser returns relative to non-trust. Consistent with the priority rule theory, but 
inconsistent with the default theory, we find that trust preferred enjoyed greater 
benefits from TARP issuance than did non-trust preferred for both forced and non-
forced banks on the October 14 TARP announcement date. In contrast, there is no 
clear priority rule effect on the approval dates for non-forced banks. Chapter 2 
examines whether share ownership structure plays a role in determining the ex-day 
pricing of dividends. If share ownership structure, specifically the proportion of the 
firm’s stock held by individuals versus institutions, has an effect on the ex-dividend 
day stock price behavior, the ex-day premium is expected to be different for firms 
with different ownership structures. Consistent with both the tax-based theory and 
the dynamic trading clientele theory, I find that the ex-day premium decreases with 
xi 
 
the level of individual ownership. Consistent with the short-term trading theory, I 
also find that the ex-day premium increases with the degree of investor 
heterogeneity, defined as the product of the proportion of the firm’s stock held by 
individual investors and the proportion held by institutional investors. The results 
suggest that the cross-sectional variation in the ex-day premium is related to the 
firm-specific share ownership structure. In addition, I find that the ex-day premium 
is positively related to the ex-day excess trading volume, indicating that a high level 
of dividend capture increases the ex-day premium. Chapter 3 investigates the 
relationship between interest rate volatility and yield spreads on noncallable bonds. 
If greater interest rate volatility increases a firm’s debt volatility, the firm is more 
likely to reach a critical value for default, thereby leading to a higher yield spread. 
We find that interest rate volatility is positively related to yield spreads on 
noncallable bonds. Our finding is consistent with the structural models of default, 
which suggest that a firm’s volatility should include its debt volatility as well as its 
equity volatility. This study also explores whether the positive effect of interest rate 
volatility on yield spreads is stronger or weaker for callable bonds than for 
noncallable bonds. We find that the positive effect of interest rate volatility on yield 
spreads is weaker for callable bonds. This result indicates there is a negative relation 
between default spreads and call spreads, which is consistent with Acharya and 
Carpenter (2002) but in contrast to King (2002).  
1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
IMPACT OF THE TARP FINANCING CHOICE ON EXISTING REFERRED 
STOCK1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
On October 14th, 2008, the U. S. Treasury announced that the largest U.S. 
banks would necessarily receive TARP capital through forced issuance of preferred 
stock and that other (smaller) banks could later apply to issue TARP preferred stock 
but would not be forced to issue preferred stock.2 The financing choice, preferred 
stock, was surprising and anticipated by very few if any. According to Landler and 
Dash (2008), even the bank CEOs present at the meeting were surprised and some 
had to be coaxed into the plan to issue preferred stock.  
Pre-existing preferred stockholders would seem obviously affected by TARP 
preferred issuance. Interestingly, Veronesi and Zingales (2010) estimate that there 
was a greater absolute total impact upon existing preferred stock than upon common 
stock in the forced banks.3 In their analysis of preferred, Veronesi and Zingales 
(2010) correctly maintain that many shares of preferred stock do not trade frequently 
enough to make a credible analysis of the change in value of each outstanding 
preferred stock. Thus, their estimate of the impact upon total preferred stock 
valuation of a firm is based only upon the most recently issued preferred stock of the 
                                                          
1
 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Duane Stock. 
2
 The large banks in their study were Bank of America, Bank of NY Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman 
Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation, Wachovia, and 
Wells Fargo. 
3
 This can be partially explained by the fact that some common stocks had a positive reaction while 
others had a negative reaction. 
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bank that was actively traded. In contrast, we find trading in numerous other 
preferred shares was quite active, thereby allowing us to analyze important 
differential preferred valuation impacts described below. 
Many banks issuing TARP preferred had various different issues of preferred 
stock outstanding with widely varying features. For example, among forced banks, 
Bank of America had 56 issues outstanding where there was great variation in 
features. One broad and important way to classify preferred stock is trust preferred 
(TP) versus non-trust preferred (NTP). Trust preferred stock is a relatively new and 
controversial instrument that has been a popular way for banks to raise capital in 
recent years. 
 The purpose of this research is to determine the impact of the largest 
government financial intervention ever, which was executed with preferred stock as 
the instrument of choice, upon different types of pre-existing bank preferred stock: 
trust preferred (TP) and non-trust preferred (NTP). Fundamental theory says that any 
security issuance should be a concern to those with claims on a firm’s cash flows 
where a claimant may be particularly concerned about claims of similar seniority. 
We focus upon the above two classes of preferred. That is, what were the differential 
impacts of TARP upon the value of pre-existing trust preferred (TP) and non-trust 
preferred (NTP) of banks issuing TARP preferred stock? We present alternative 
theories and hypotheses for the impact of TARP on these two classes of preferred 
stock. NTP and TARP preferred have equal priority claim where both are lower 
priority than TP. We suggest that TP may have the strongest reaction because the 
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issuance of TARP preferred, which is junior to TP, created more assets financed by a 
lower priority claim. There is no such clear positive priority effect for NTP because 
TARP preferred had equal seniority to NTP. Alternatively, NTP may exhibit the 
stronger reaction because the announcement of TARP preferred issuance may have 
more strongly reduced the near term probability of runs and loss for NTP than for 
TP. 
As pointed out by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Miller and Rock (1985), new 
issuance may convey unfavorable endogenous information thus confounding tests of 
the priority rule. New information suggested by issuance of a particular type of 
security affects other security prices by revising investor forecasts about the value of 
the issuing firm. For example, issuance of junior debt may convey unfavorable 
information about the value of the firm, thereby negatively affecting the value of 
senior debt. In such a setting, priority rule effects will not be cleanly tested since it is 
very difficult to separate the priority rule effect from the endogenous information 
effects. Therefore, previous studies that have investigated the impact of the issuance 
of one type of security on a different type of security could not separate the 
information effect from other effects.  
Our study compares the difference in the impact of the issuance of TARP 
preferred stock on the two types of existing preferred stock with different priorities 
of claims. Any potential differential impacts on TP and NTP result from the 
difference in seniority of TP and NTP. Therefore, comparing the differential impacts 
of TARP preferred stock issuance on TP versus NTP provides an attractive setting to 
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purely test the impact of the priority rule on the values of individual classes of 
claims.   
Of course, one may ask the same questions of both forced and non-forced 
banks. Additionally, did the impact of TARP issuance on non-forced smaller banks 
differ from that of forced banks? We ask this because conditions surrounding TARP 
issuance for non-forced were much different than for forced banks. Non-forced 
banks had to be approved, and, also, had a choice of whether to issue or not issue. 
We investigate whether any potential difference in returns between TP and NTP 
occurred on October 14 or on the approval date. 
Even more interesting, the news that a non-forced bank applied and was 
subsequently approved to issue was very complex information. 4  That is, some 
investors may have perceived approval to issue as a sign of weakness (the bank 
needed special access to capital) while other investors may have seen the approval as 
a strong indication that the bank was healthy enough to be permitted to issue TARP 
preferred. 5  Furthermore, some investors may have seen TARP as a smart, 
inexpensive subsidized way to raise capital while, on the other hand, other investors 
may have seen it as an unwelcome opportunity for the government to impose 
undesirable restrictions and regulations on the bank which would reduce future 
flexibility and profitability.    
                                                          
4
 The public was not informed that a bank had applied and not been approved. Only eventual 
acceptance of an application was public. 
5
 The U. S Treasury announced that for a non-forced bank to be eligible to issue TARP preferred, the 
bank must show that it was financially healthy. 
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Relatively little attention has been paid to preferred equity issuance in the 
finance literature. However, according to Kallberg, Liu, and Villupuram (2008), 
from 1999 to 2005 U.S. firms issued practically as much preferred stock as through 
common equity IPOs and seasoned equity offerings. TARP preferred stock 
substantially increased the amount of outstanding bank preferred stock. For example, 
the TARP plan increased the outstanding preferred stock of JPMorgan Chase from 
$8.1 billion (third quarter of 2008) to $31.94 billion (fourth quarter of 2008). 
Furthermore, State Street bank had no preferred stock outstanding. We note that the 
impact of preferred stock issuance on the banking firm’s capital structure had 
become an important issue even before October 2008. Kwan (2009) notes many 
banks raised capital by issuing preferred stock in response to economic conditions 
prior to that time. Salutric and Wilcox (2009) report a very strong growth in number 
of bank holding companies with preferred stock outstanding in the last decade. 
We find that, consistent with the priority rule, TP for forced banks clearly 
enjoyed greater returns than NTP for forced banks on the October 14 TARP 
announcement date. TP appears to have benefited more from the forced TARP 
preferred issuance than NTP because the TARP issuance provided an additional asset 
base for TP. Any potential greater reduction in default risk for NTP was not strong 
enough to dominate this effect. In addition, weaker forced banks realized greater 
benefits from TARP on October 14. 
With regard to the difference between TP and NTP for non-forced banks, TP 
had a stronger positive return for the October 14 TARP announcement but not for the 
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approval announcement. It appears that the market expected some banks to apply for 
and receive TARP upon the October 14 announcement. For non-forced banks the 
evidence regarding TP and NTP pooled is that there was a positive return for the 
announcement of approval to issue TARP preferred. That is, the market seems to 
have perceived potential approval to issue TARP preferred as net favorable 
information.  
Section one describes the financial crisis that peaked in 2008 and alternative 
hypotheses about the impact of TARP preferred upon previously existing preferred. 
We include financial theory and hypotheses for why announcement effects may 
differ due to firm-specific and security-specific characteristics such as TP and NTP, 
and, also, why the pattern of TARP announcement effects may differ across forced 
and non-forced banks. The second section describes the data and the results are 
reported in the third section. We present conclusions in the last section.   
 
II. The Crisis and Hypotheses 
 In 2008, the financial system was frequently in turmoil. One of the most 
important events was the September 15 Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.  
It was the largest bankruptcy filing in U. S. history and made some suspect that the 
world’s financial system was at risk of failing. A few days later, September 18, in an 
effort to convince world markets that the U.S. financial system would not fail, the U. 
S. Treasury proposed a $700 billion system wide plan to provide any needed rescue 
where the plan was called TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program). Previous 
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(summer 2008) preliminary plans had frequently advocated using the rescue funds 
for government purchase of troubled assets, such as stressed mortgage backed 
securities, from banks. The plan was very controversial in numerous ways and on 
September 30, the House of Representatives defeated President Bush’s TARP plan. 
On October 3, 2008, TARP finally passed Congress assuring that $700 billion of 
some type of aid was forthcoming. However, this legislation did not designate how 
the aid would be administered. The U.S. stock market did not seem impressed with 
the TARP plan as stock indices declined dramatically in the week after the October 3 
TARP passage; for example, the S&P 500 declined more than 10%. 
 How would the $700 billion of aid be administered and how would it affect 
bank balance sheets? The October 3 passage of TARP allowed the purchase of 
troubled assets, although this was very controversial. Some suggested the Treasury 
should buy common stock of banks but this was strongly criticized partially because, 
for example, common stock ownership would give a strong appearance of 
government-owned banks due to common stock holder voting rights.    
The surprising final form of the TARP program for banks turned out to be U. 
S. Treasury purchase of bank preferred stock. More specifically, the preferred was 
non-trust (NTP) stock paying a 5% dividend for the first five years where, after five 
years, the rate would be reset at 9%. The TARP preferred stock had no maturity date 
(perpetuity) and qualified as Tier 1 capital. Importantly, the priority ranking of 
payment was equal to NTP but junior to TP.6 There were no voting rights except for 
                                                          
6
 See http://bankbryancave.com/tarp-capitial-faq/ 
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authorization of shares senior to senior preferred.7 Warrants to purchase common 
stock (with a term of 10 years) having aggregate market price of 15% of TARP 
preferred were attached. Redemption rules were complex as the TARP preferred 
stock was not redeemable for three years except from a qualified common equity 
offering which resulted in gross proceeds to the bank of not less than 25% of the 
issue price of TARP preferred. After three years, it was redeemable in whole or in 
part at any time.  
Figure I describes the basic framework of our analysis. We analyze the 
impact of the October 14 announcement on both forced and non-forced banks (that 
eventually issued TARP preferred). As discussed and given below, forced banks are 
classified as either voluntary (VB) or involuntary (IVB). Furthermore, we analyze 
the subsequent announcement effect of non-forced bank approval to issue TARP 
preferred. That is, we analyze two announcements for non-forced banks. 
**** Insert Figure I here **** 
A. Hypotheses on the Impact of TARP Preferred Issuance: Forced Banks 
Previously existing preferred stock on bank balance sheets (before October 
2008) was heterogeneous with regard to seniority. See Table I for seniority variation 
of bank claims. Rose and Hudgins (2010) report that preferred stock had increased 
its share of bank financing in the early part of the century partially due to the 
emergence of TP which is a hybrid security.  
***** Insert Table I here **** 
                                                          
7
 Also, there were voting rights for amendments to the rights of senior preferred and mergers and 
other events which could adversely affect rights of senior preferred. 
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 Figure II illustrates the TP issuance process. In order to create trust preferred 
stock, the issuing firm creates a special purpose trust. The trust then issues trust 
preferred stock to investors and lends the proceeds to the issuing firm. In return for 
the proceeds that the issuing firm borrows from the trust, the issuing firm issues 
junior subordinated debt to the trust. As a result, the interest payments to the trust are 
equal to the dividend payments to the shareholders with the trust preferred stock. 
This process explains why TP stock has higher priority than NTP stock. Very 
importantly, TP was considered Tier 1 capital and was particularly popular for large 
banks. Classification as Tier 1 was controversial where many analysts suggested it 
should be disallowed where we note that Dodd-Franks legislation passed in 2010 
does not permit TP to be considered Tier 1 capital.  
**** Insert Figure II here **** 
It is clear that bank preferred stockholders had much to fear in the fall of 
2008 as many preferred stockholders suffered large losses when firms failed or were 
reorganized just prior to October 2008. Lehman Brothers, Washington Mutual, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were all cases where preferred claims were essentially 
erased.8 
Numerous researchers have empirically examined the impact of an issuance 
of one type of security on the value of common equity. For example, with respect to 
the impact of security issuance on common equity, Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and 
Eckbo (1986) document an insignificant common equity price reaction to debt 
                                                          
8
 See Spence (2008) and Bary (2009). 
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issuance. Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) find that straight and convertible debt 
issuance lead to significantly negative abnormal common equity returns in the long-
term.9 In contrast, the impact of security issuance upon existing preferred stock is 
scarce.10   
Relative to our first hypothesis, given below, and the impact of security 
issuance on outstanding debt, Linn and Stock (2005) investigate the impact of the 
issuance of a lower priority claim, junior debt, upon a higher claim, senior unsecured 
debt. First, they hypothesize that if junior debt is issued to replace bank debt, senior 
unsecured is enhanced because claims of higher standing (bank debt) are eliminated. 
Second, and particularly relevant to our analysis of preferred issuance, they 
hypothesize that if junior debt is issued for investment purposes, the new issue 
provides an additional asset base for the senior unsecured debt, thus enhancing the 
value of senior unsecured debt.  
We present four hypotheses where the first and second apply to forced banks 
and the third and fourth apply to non-forced banks. 
Hypothesis 1a. Trust preferred (TP) stock of forced banks should have greater 
returns than non-trust preferred (NTP) stock.  
                                                          
9
 According to the signaling theory of Ross (1977) and the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf 
(1984), issuances of securities disclose information on the value of the issuing firm. For example, the 
signaling model of Ross (1977) predicts that leverage-increasing announcement conveys favorable 
information. On the other hand, the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) suggests that 
external financing announcements convey unfavorable information. Denis (2004) argues that 
managers signal their confidence in the firm’s prospects by agreeing to issue a senior claim like 
preferred stock. 
10
 Harvey, Collins, and Wansley (2003) find positive impacts of trust-preferred issuance on both 
equity and debt. Kallberg, Liu, and Villupuram (2008) also investigate the impact of preferred 
issuance on both equity and debt. 
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Table I shows the seniority of claims on banks where TP is senior to NTP. If 
the priority rule holds, TP stockholders may benefit more from the October 14th 
announcement than NTP stockholders because the issuance of TARP preferred stock, 
which is junior to TP, provides an additional asset base. That is, there are more assets 
to generate greater revenue to service TP and, also, distribute to TP in event of 
bankruptcy. This effect is similar to an issuance of common stock reducing the risk 
of the firm’s debt because the firm has greater assets and is less levered. 11    
Hypothesis 1b. Non-trust preferred (NTP) stock should have greater returns than 
trust preferred (TP) stock.  
Given the uncertainty about the soundness of the financial system and how 
effective TARP would be, we suggest there was very significant default (bankruptcy) 
and “run” risk for both types of preferred stock before the October TARP plan was 
announced. In general, one might expect lower priority claims to likely be more 
sensitive to changes in the firm’s outlook. For example, common stock is typically 
                                                          
11
 Another reason for TP returns to be greater than NTP returns is that conditions surrounding TARP 
preferred issuance may be viewed as roughly similar to the conditions describing debt overhang 
(underinvestment). Related to this, Veronisi and Zingales (2009) refer to a co-insurance effect. Banks 
were highly levered in October 2008 and economic conditions suggested potential future scenarios 
where debt holders would not be paid in full.  Many U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve economists 
likely hoped the banks would issue more common equity to reduce the turmoil in financial markets 
but banks would certainly have to sell common equity at depressed prices if they could sell common 
equity at all. A common equity issuance would likely have benefitted claims on bank debt more than 
bank common equity claims; in other words, common equity would potentially transfer wealth to 
bond holders and the value of existing common equity may have declined. The same logic can be 
applied to existing NTP stock as NTP is, like common equity, a lower claim than debt. Thus the value 
of existing preferred NTP could have declined upon TARP issuance whereas TP would not be 
affected in such a process. In fact, TP may have benefitted at the expense of NTP in this process as TP 
is a higher claim. The fact that the U.S. government intervened may have reduced the magnitude of 
debt overhang effects upon returns but not eliminated debt overhang effects.   
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thought to be more sensitive to changes in a firm’s outlook than the firm’s debt and, 
furthermore, junior debt is typically thought more sensitive to changes in the firm’s 
outlook than senior debt. Similarly, if the October 14 TARP announcement reduced 
the overall default (run) risk of banks, then the default risk of lower  priority (NTP) 
preferred stock may decline more than that of higher priority (TP) preferred stock. 
Therefore, lower priority lower priority (NTP) claims may be more enhanced than 
higher priority (TP) preferred stock claims.  
As evidence that default risk could potentially decline more for NTP than 
TP, we consider a day where assumedly favorable news reducing the likelihood of 
default was released. As mentioned above, on September 18, 2008 the Treasury 
announced that the government was very willing to provide an injection of funds into 
the financial system to prevent widespread panic but, as stated above, did not specify 
the nature of the injection. This was apparently received as very positive news 
because bank stock prices rose dramatically soon after September 18.  
We gathered matching pairs of September 18, 2008 TP and NTP raw 
returns. For the match, we first required the two matched preferred stocks to have the 
same issuer. Second, the matches were required to have similar maturities and 
dividend yields. We allowed a maximum of one year’s difference for maturity. For a 
perpetuity, our match required at least 59 years maturity. Regarding dividend yield, 
we allow a maximum of one percent difference.  
These criteria resulted in sixteen TP/NTP pairs as given in panel A of Table 
II. In nine of these pairs, the raw return for NTP was greater than TP and, also, the 
13 
 
average return (0.137) for NTP was greater than the average return (0.102) for TP in 
panel B of Table II. Furthermore, we additionally treated each firm’s preferred stock 
as a portfolio of individual returns in which case there were four portfolios where 
NTP was greater and one portfolio where TP was greater. In summary, this table 
suggests that there clearly are cases where NTP returns can be stronger than TP 
returns due to news that can be construed as reducing credit risk and default 
potential. Of course, unlike the October 14 announcement, this particular news event 
did not have an indication that preferred stock would be issued.  
***** Insert Table II here **** 
Hypothesis 2:  The greater the Treasury OVERPAYMENT for TARP preferred 
stock, the greater the returns to pre-existing preferred stock.  
There was strong agreement that the U.S. Treasury overpaid for TARP 
preferred stock by purchasing 5% dividend yield preferred. According to Wilson and 
Wu (2009), just prior to the government capital infusion, the preferred stock of many 
of the banks receiving TARP funds traded at yields between 9.62 percent and 11.7 
percent.12 The government’s overpayment for TARP preferred stock thus led to a 
favorable, low cost of funds for the banks. Such a favorable funding source may 
have resulted in an increase in preferred stockholders’ wealth. Table III shows 
average preferred stock yields and overpayment, defined as the difference in 
preferred yield just before TARP and the 5% of the TARP preferred.  
***** Insert Table III here **** 
                                                          
12
 See Wilson and Wu (2009) and Veronesi and Zingales (2009).  
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We suggest that the degree of overpayment may be related to the idea that 
some forced banks voluntarily participated (VB banks) in TARP while others were 
largely involuntary participants (IVB banks). See Figure I. VBs are roughly 
represented by those associated with greater overpayment in Table III whereas IVBs 
are those with lesser overpayment. Preferred stock yields reflect risk premia and a 
bank paying a higher risk premium was more likely to benefit from the government 
rescue and overpayment for TARP preferred. Based on this reasoning, we classify 
Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and Bank of America as VBs, and, in contrast, Goldman 
Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of NY Mellon, and Wells Fargo as IVBs. VBs may 
realize greater returns than IVBs as they more clearly needed the help and paid for 
the needed funding at the same below market yields. 
B. Hypotheses on the Impact of TARP Preferred Issuance: Non-Forced Banks  
Non-forced banks were also part of the TARP preferred stock program and 
some of the above theories and hypotheses obviously also apply to non-forced banks. 
However, we now note some important differences for analysis of non-forced banks. 
We again refer to Figure I. Smaller banks were not forced to issue preferred stock, 
i.e. they had an option of applying or not applying. Additionally, the U.S. Treasury 
announced that banks that were particularly weak and in danger of failing would not 
be approved. Some banks may have applied to issue TARP preferred stock in order 
to signal to the market that they were healthy enough to receive TARP. On the other 
hand, some banks likely took pride in not applying for TARP funds and thought that 
the lack of need for TARP signaled strength. If a bank did apply, the Treasury would 
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grant (or not) preliminary approval. If a bank was denied, there was no public 
announcement. In summary, for non-forced banks, we observe that the timing of the 
non-forced TARP issuance was not a surprise (exogenous) financing requirement 
forced on the bank. Instead, for a non-forced bank, TARP financing was an 
endogenous decision.  
We call our sample of smaller banks with actively traded existing preferred 
stock outstanding that soon subsequently soon issued TARP preferred (before 2009) 
non-forced banks. Of course the same questions plus additional questions can be 
posed about their participation and the impact on their existing preferred stock.  
Consideration of two obviously separate events for non-forced banks (that 
ultimately issued TARP preferred stock) leads to the following hypothesis. These 
two events are a.) the October 14 announcement and b.) the subsequent approval day 
for a non-forced bank. See Figure I. 
Hypothesis 3a: Any potential difference in returns between TP and NTP resulting 
from hypothesis 1a (priority effect) or hypothesis 1b (default effect) occurred on the 
October 14 TARP announcement date. That is, expectations were formed on October 
14 with regard to which non-forced banks would apply for and receive TARP. 
Simply put, the October TARP announcement contained information that 
TARP capital would also be available to other “healthy” banks that would apply for 
TARP. If the market expected a particular bank to apply for and receive TARP upon 
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the October 14 announcement, the prices of TP and NTP would reflect this 
expectation on the October 14 announcement date.13  
Hypothesis 3b: Any potential difference in returns between TP and NTP resulting 
from hypothesis 1a (priority effect) or hypothesis 1b (default effect) occurred on the 
date the bank was approved to issue TARP preferred.  
 That is, on October 14 the market for bank preferred stocks may have been 
slow to realize the application procedures for non-forced banks to issue TARP 
preferred. Furthermore, banks themselves may have been indecisive concerning the 
wisdom of applying for TARP. Thus, any potential impact on TP versus NTP, 
described in hypothesis 1a (priority effect) or hypothesis 1b (default effect), may 
have been delayed until approval date. In other words, only weak expectations were 
formed on October 14 with regard to which non-forced banks would be approved for 
TARP.  
 Given the complexities surrounding TARP issuance for non-forced banks, an 
important question is whether the announcement of TARP approval was good or bad 
news for existing preferred stockholders. 
Hypothesis 4a: The approval day impact upon the pool of preferred stock (TP and 
NTP pooled) was positive. 
As mentioned above, announcement of approval could be construed as good 
news by investors if it meant the bank had passed a test as being healthy enough to 
                                                          
13
 O’Hara and Shaw (1990) examined how the announcement that some banks were “too big to fail” 
affected stock prices of banks. They find that investors reacted to Wall Street Journal reports of a list 
of banks that were expected to be announced as too big to fail by the Comptroller of the Currency. 
Curiously, the Wall Street Journal list turned out to be different from the Comptroller’s list. 
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issue TARP. Also, approval may be construed as good news because the bank may 
have found an inexpensive source of preferred financing where this is clearly related 
to the government overpayment for TARP preferred. 
Hypothesis 4b:  The approval day impact upon the pool of preferred stock (TP and 
NTP pooled) was negative. 
On the other hand, the news of approval to issue TARP preferred may have 
been negative because investors may have perceived such an announcement as an 
admission that the bank needed help, and furthermore, the government would be 
inefficiently intervening in the management of the bank. More specifically, TARP 
issuance forced such banks to accept government regulations that could hinder future 
bank profitability and reduce returns for preferred stockholders. For example, banks 
taking TARP funds had to accept limits on employee pay where the common 
complaint was that banks could not retain and attract the best talent. According to 
Ertimur, Ferri, and Stubben (2010), firms receiving TARP funds must hold an annual 
advisory vote on executive compensation. Furthermore, the TARP program imposed 
complex dividend restrictions on preferred stock. Finally, the government had the 
right to change the terms of the TARP issuance at any time until the funds were 
repaid. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
The data for forced preferred stock prices, TP versus NTP classification, 
maturity, and dividend yield were obtained from the Bloomberg information system. 
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We restrict the sample to nonconvertible preferred stock that traded on more than 
100 dates before TARP in the period November 1, 2007 to October 6, 2008 in order 
to assure credible pricing information. The forced-bank sample includes 121 
preferred stocks of which 53 are TP while 68 are NTP.  Maturities range from 
November 30, 2009 to perpetual maturity.  
The forced sample with respect to issuing bank, TP versus NTP, callability, 
and dividend are summarized in Panel A of Table IV. Bank of America clearly had 
the most different preferred shares outstanding with 56 while Morgan Stanley had 
22. Note that State Street had no preferred (neither TP nor NTP) outstanding. Bank 
of NY Mellon had only TP outstanding. The Bank of America preferred stock 
included preferred stock of Merrill Lynch while Wells Fargo preferred stock 
included preferred stock of Wachovia as it was announced Bank of America (Wells 
Fargo) would take over Merrill Lynch (Wachovia) before October 14, 2008.14   
***** Insert Table IV here **** 
For non-forced banks, the data is similarly gathered from Bloomberg and 
given in Panel B of Table IV. The criteria for inclusion in the sample of non-forced 
banks were the same as for forced: traded on more than 100 dates before TARP in 
the period November 1, 2007 to October 6, 2008. The TARP preferred in the non-
forced sample was announced as approved between October 24 and December 23, 
2008.  
                                                          
14
 In regressions reported later, firm characteristics of Bank of America and Wells Fargo were 
combined with those of Merrill Lynch and Wachovia. 
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To measure returns or abnormal returns for each preferred stock we used 
raw returns, the mean-adjusted return, and the OLS market model returns.15 Mean-
adjusted returns, as described by Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) and others, are the 
returns over the event windows less the average returns from a recent extended time 
frame. For our analysis, we use the average of November 1, 2007 to October 6, 2008. 
The S&P preferred index was used as the market index. The beta was estimated 
using daily returns from November 1, 2007 to October 6, 2008. We calculated raw 
returns or abnormal returns for four different windows where we emphasize the two-
day event window (-1,0); that is, the period from close October 12 to close October 
14. This is because U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson held a meeting with the 
CEOs of the nine largest banks on October 13th and the Treasury announced its plan 
to purchase bank preferred stock on October 14th.16  
Even though we report raw, mean-adjusted, and market model returns, we 
feel the following comment critical of market model returns is appropriate where we 
note market model returns of the forced banks are reported in Appendix B. If one 
estimates the excess return on existing preferred with a market model, where betas 
                                                          
15
 See Brown and Warner (1985) for a comparison between the mean-adjusted model and the market 
model. Linn and Pinegar (1988) used the mean-adjusted model in their examination of the effects of 
preferred stock issuance on preferred stock returns. On the other hand, Veronesi and Zingales (2009) 
used the market model based on the S&P 500 index in their event study on preferred stock. Our 
market model is based on the S&P preferred index. The S&P preferred index represents the U.S. 
preferred stock market by including all preferred stocks issued by U.S. corporations and those trading 
in major exchanges. To our best knowledge, no previous event study on preferred stock has been done 
using the S&P preferred index. 
16
 U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson called the CEOs of the nine largest banks to a meeting at 
3:00 p.m. on October 13th, and the CEOs turned in their time sheets by 6:30 p.m. According to the 
Dow Jones News Service, at 5:10 p.m. on October 13th, the Wall Street Journal reported that the nine 
largest banks would receive TARP capital through issuance of preferred stock. On October 14th, the 
Treasury announced its plan to purchase preferred stock of the nine largest banks.   
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are estimated, the positive impact of the October 14 announcement is clearly 
underestimated because the market return was strongly (positively) affected by the 
announcement. That is, the market model leads to biased results if the event study 
focuses on the impact of an event on abnormal returns and the event influences the 
market index. If this is the case, it does not make sense to control for the market 
movement since the market movement was also affected by the event.17 In light of 
the above, it would seem that using mean-adjusted returns and, also, using raw 
returns, are better approaches than the market model because they do not 
underestimate the response of our sample preferred stocks.  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
We now examine the realized reaction of different preferred stock issues to 
the October TARP announcement in Tables V through IX with forced results 
reported in Tables V to VII and non-forced results reported in Tables VIII and IX. 
Did TP or NTP experience greater returns? We first report the event study for banks 
forced to issue TARP preferred. We immediately follow this event study with a 
cross-sectional regression of forced bank returns to help analyze how the effects may 
have varied due to firm and issue-specific effects such as TP versus NTP, Treasury 
overpayment for TARP preferred, and control variables.  
                                                          
17
 We attempted to create an index consisting of only non-financial institutions. However, we note 
that non-financial institutions also showed high raw returns on Oct. 13 and Oct. 14. The average raw 
returns for non-financial institutions whose preferred stock price information was available on 
Bloomberg was 17.88% on [-1,0] while those for financial institutions was 20.74%. 
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After the analysis of forced banks, we then examine the reaction of non-
forced banks that announced they had been approved to issue TARP preferred stock 
soon after the October TARP announcement. Did any difference in TP and NTP 
returns occur on the October 14 announcement, or the approval day, or both? Did the 
approval announcement have a positive or negative impact on non-forced returns? In 
this context, we conduct event studies (for both October 14 and approval day) 
followed by cross-sectional regression analysis of returns.  See Figure I. 
A. Forced Bank Empirical Results  
Table V represents the event study results for forced banks. There are four 
different windows (0,0), (-1,0) (-2,+2), and (-5,+5) where (0,0) is the close of 
October 13 to close of October 14 and (-1,0) is the close of October 12 to close of 
October 14. There are four panels composed of raw and mean adjusted returns. For 
each type of return there is 1.) an equal weighted return which is an average of all 
individual preferred stocks and 2.) a portfolio-based return which is the portfolio (all 
preferred of a particular bank) average return of all forced banks. In Panels B and D 
for portfolio returns, the ALL portfolio has only 13 portfolios where each bank 
(except Bank of New York Mellon) had a portfolio of both TP and NTP.18 Thus, 
there are only 7 TP portfolios and 6 NTP portfolios in Panels B and D.   
***** Insert Table V here **** 
The first line in each of the four panels (All) does not distinguish between 
TP and NTP and thus reflects the generalized average reaction of all (TP and NTP 
                                                          
18
 As noted above, Bank of New York Mellon had only TP and State Street had no preferred 
outstanding. 
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pooled) preferred stock. For example, the raw returns for all preferred stock in the (-
1,0) window of Panel A is 0.2467 (24.67%). Immediately below that line we give 
both the conventional T-statistics and, also, T-statistics using the crude dependence 
adjustment of Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). For the (-1,0) window the 
conventional T-statistic is 15.68 and the crude dependence adjustment T-statistic is 
9.53 where both are clearly positive and significant. Thus, the impact of the October 
14 announcement upon TP and NTP treated as a combined pool of preferred stock is 
to enhance existing preferred stock value.19   
The next lines in each panel show similar results for trust preferred (TP) 
returns (only). Below that, non-trust (NTP) returns (only) are shown. Finally, we 
report a T-statistic for the difference in mean between TP and NTP. For example, in 
the (-1,0) window, the T-statistic for the difference is 5.72 which is clearly 
significant suggesting that TP returns are stronger than NTP. Thus, hypothesis 1a is 
supported and hypothesis 1b is not supported. In other words, the results support the 
priority rule hypothesis that TARP issuance provided a significant additional margin 
                                                          
19
 There are two reasons for expecting a pooled positive reaction. First, in early October 2008, the risk 
that some banks could become bankrupt thus causing default for some claim holders, including 
preferred stock, was significant. Veronesi and Zingales (2009) computed the probability of early 
bankruptcy less that of later bankruptcy and suggested the difference is an indicator of the likelihood 
of a run on the bank. Here a strong likelihood of a run suggests near term bankruptcy. In fact, for the 
forced banks, Veronesi and Zingales (2009) show that Citigroup, Wachovia and all three investment 
banks showed clear indications of a run. In our work, if TARP preferred issuance potentially reduces 
the near term risk of runs and early bankruptcy for existing preferred, then the impact could be 
positive. In other words, forestalled bankruptcy may have had a positive impact on existing preferred 
stock. A second reason to expect a positive reaction is that there was a strong agreement that the U.S. 
Treasury overpaid for TARP preferred stock. On the other hand, the effect could have been negative. 
That is, the requirement that large banks would have to issue preferred stock could be perceived as 
negative news for preferred stockholders because banks may have chosen alternative ways, mentioned 
above, to receive aid. Some may have wanted the Treasury to instead purchase troubled assets, as was 
commonly expected in the months before the October TARP program. Some forced banks were 
clearly not happy with the TARP preferred stock program and had to be coaxed to accept it.  
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of safety (asset base) for TP where this effect dominated any potential stronger 
reduction in default risk of NTP. Note that in Panels B and D the small sample sizes 
for the portfolio approach make it extremely difficult to find statistical significance. 
Still, the signs are positive as in Panels A and C and there is a large positive 
difference in TP versus NTP. 
 Table VI represents cross-sectional regression results of returns. Firm 
specific characteristics are controlled by using dummy variables that refer to 
particular bank names. Wells Fargo is used as the benchmark. Since Wells Fargo is 
one of Involuntary Banks (IVBs), positive signs on Voluntary Banks (VBs) are 
expected. There are two panels consisting of raw (Panel A) and mean adjusted (Panel 
B) returns. There are three different regression specifications where certain 
independent variables are omitted. For our purposes, the most important factor is the 
TP / NTP dummy where TP has value one and NTP is zero.  
***** Insert Table VI here **** 
We include numerous control variables that may affect returns where the 
most interesting control variable may be callability. That is, some preferred stock has 
an embedded call option where the firm can redeem the claim at a specified price. 
The value of preferred stock with a call will tend to decline with greater call value as 
the claim holder is short (issuer is long) in the call option. One might suggest that 
callable preferred stock had greater returns than non-callable preferred stock due to 
the October 14 announcement. To support this suggestion, King (2002) maintains 
that there is a positive relationship between default risk and option value in bonds 
24 
 
because of a higher volatility in the underlying instrument that occurs due to greater 
default risk. If TARP reduces default risk and related volatility on preferred stock, 
the call option value decreases and returns for callable preferred stock may thus be 
higher than returns for non-callable preferred stock.  
Alternatively, callable preferred stock may have lower returns than non-
callable preferred stock, as suggested by Lakshmivarahan, Stock, and Qian (2009) 
and Acharya and Carpenter (2002). They note that the preferred stock and any call 
value is extinguished upon default. Therefore, if TARP reduces default risk, the call 
option value may increase and returns for callable preferred stock may thus be lower 
than non-callable preferred stock. Remaining time to maturity is included as longer 
maturity securities would be expected to be more sensitive to news.  
Consistent with results in the above event study, Table VI shows that 
existing TP stockholders enjoy greater returns than NTP stockholders. For example, 
the coefficients of TRUST in the three columns of Panel A based upon raw returns 
are 0.1087, 0.1228, and 0.1041, respectively where all are positive and clearly 
significant. This means the hypothesis that TP enjoyed greater returns than NTP due 
to their higher priority is supported. In fact, these coefficients suggest the difference 
between returns is very large where TP returns were approximately 10% greater than 
NTP on the announcement day.  
With regard to dummy variables representing individual banks, Table VI 
results illustrate that existing preferred stockholders of voluntary banks (VBs) 
enjoyed higher returns (VBs have larger coefficients) than those of involuntary banks 
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(IVBs). Such a result is consistent with our hypothesis that preferred stockholders in 
banks with greater need for aid, as measured by U. S. Treasury overpayment for 
preferred stock, benefited much more than others. As previously mentioned, Morgan 
Stanley, Citigroup, and Bank of America are designated as VBs while Goldman 
Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of NY Mellon, and Wells Fargo are designated IVBs. 
Consistent with the hypothesis, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and Bank of America 
coefficients are all significant and positive when Wells Fargo (an IVB) is used as a 
benchmark. More specifically, the Morgan Stanley coefficient suggests that average 
returns for Morgan Stanley preferred stockholders (TP and NTP pooled) were 
approximately 37% more than for Wells Fargo preferred stockholders. Furthermore, 
note that Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan Chase coefficients were not significant 
which suggests that average TP and NTP preferred returns were not significantly 
greater than Wells Fargo. 
Callable preferred stocks enjoyed greater returns than non-callable preferred 
stocks. This result is consistent with the idea that there is a positive relation between 
default risk and option value. That is, it seems likely that TARP issuance strongly 
reduced future default risk and price volatility for preferred stock and therefore 
reduced call option values. Prices of callable preferred increased on the 
announcement date due to this effect more than for non-callable preferred. Preferred 
stocks with longer maturity show higher returns. This is logically because preferred 
stock with longer maturity enjoyed the reduction in the overall default risk of forced 
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banks more than preferred stock with shorter maturity; longer maturity instruments 
tend to be more sensitive to TARP.20  
 Table VII presents an alternative cross-sectional specification. As opposed to 
the previous table, which uses the particular bank names, government overpayment 
for preferred (OVERPAYMENT) is used to represent the particular bank’s need for 
government help and credit quality. Like the previous set of regressions, there are 
panels for both raw and mean adjusted regressions and there are three different 
specifications (columns) in each panel where certain independent variables are 
omitted.   
***** Insert Table VII here **** 
The main results are again that TP enjoys returns about 10% greater than 
NTP in all estimations.  Furthermore, the greater the government overpayment, the 
greater the return which means that banks paying greater risk premia benefitted more 
from TARP issuance. For a robustness check, we also ran a separate regression to 
correct for any potential clustering problem. Appendix A shows that the TRUST 
coefficient is robust and remains positive and significant.   
We furthermore tried many other variables in the regressions of forced banks 
to determine if our results were robust. For example, we included preferred stock 
ratings obtained from S&P preferred stock ratings because stronger firms might not 
need the capital infusion as much as weaker firms. In addition, we considered Tier 1 
                                                          
20
 For example, longer time bonds are more price sensitive to inflation and interest rate news as their 
coupon stream is longer. 
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capital as an explanatory variable. Specifically, Tier 1 capital is defined as a bank’s 
Tier 1 capital divided by its total risk-weighted assets. We included Tier 1 capital 
because one may have expected that banks with lower Tier 1 capital ratios may have 
enjoyed a stronger return from issuing TARP preferred as it was counted in Tier 1. 
However, regressions with rating and Tier 1, not reported here, did not change our 
basic results with respect to our hypotheses.21  
B. Non-Forced Bank Empirical Results  
Table VIII contains analysis for banks not forced to issue preferred stock but 
who chose to apply for approval after October 14 and were approved. As in Table V, 
Table VIII shows panels composed of raw and mean adjusted returns. Again, for 
each type of return, there are both the equal weight (individual issue) approach and 
the portfolio (all preferred of a particular bank) approach. The difference from Table 
V is that Table VIII has two windows as reflected in the last two columns. See 
Figure III for the windows used. The first window is (-1,0) which is the same 
window (reflecting the October 14 announcement) as the forced banks. The second 
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 Furthermore, we considered the size of the issue relative to total assets for non-forced banks. For 
forced banks, the amount of TARP to be issued was prescribed and forced by the Treasury such that 
the banking firm had no choice on size of issue. Some forced banks wanted to issue TARP preferred 
whereas others did not (voluntary versus involuntary). If a forced bank had been permitted to choose 
the size of issue and also clearly needed a preferred capital infusion (VB), it could well be that the 
more TARP preferred the better for the bank. On the other hand, if a forced bank did not want to issue 
any TARP preferred (IVB), the less the better. The scenario for non-forced banks was different. That 
is, it is logical to assume the bank, having an option, actually wanted to issue TARP preferred and 
also chose, up to the mandated limit, the amount thought optimal for the bank. Non-forced banks 
choosing to issue more TARP apparently foresaw greater benefit to the optional government program. 
However, size of issue for non-forced banks turned out to not have a significant effect on our 
empirical results. We also included a zero dividend dummy because Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, 
and Xu (2009) argue that zero-coupon bonds are more volatile. However, the zero dividend dummy 
did not have a significant effect on our empirical results. 
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window is the day the bank announced that it had received preliminary approval for 
TARP preferred issuance.22  
**** Insert Figure III here **** 
***** Insert Table VIII here **** 
As we did for forced banks, we first consider the impact of the 
announcement upon all (pooled) preferred stock in Table VIII. For the October 14 
window, which is the (-1,0) window of the table, the announcement has positive and 
significant impact in the first lines of Panels A,B, C, and D. The results for the 
approval window are also positive which supports hypothesis 4a; that is, the 
preferred stockholders perceived the information that a firm was approved for TARP 
preferred as positive news.  
Did any differential between TP and NTP occur in the (-1,0) window 
because the market expected non-forced banks to soon issue TARP preferred? Or, 
did any differential in TP and NTP occur upon approval to issue TARP preferred? 
The results for comparing TP versus NTP returns are that TP enjoyed greater returns 
than NTP only in the (-1,0) window but not in the “approval” window which 
supports hypothesis 3a. For example, the T-statistic for difference in mean between 
TP and NTP in Panel A is 5.27 in the (-1,0) window, but 0.00 in the “approval” 
window.23  
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 The sample sizes of all pooled preferred, TP, and NTP are different for (-1,0) and “upon approval” 
announcement because a preferred stock is included in the sample only if trading occurs on the event 
window. For example, in panel A, 54 preferred stocks traded in (-1,0) while only 50 preferred stocks 
traded on the announcement window of approval for TARP. 
23
  The value is 8.29 for the T-statistic using crude dependence adjustment in the (-1,0) window. 
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Table IX presents cross-sectional regression results for non-forced banks. 
Given that non-forced banks tend to have fewer different preferred issues 
outstanding, it is econometrically impossible to use bank names to control for firm 
specific effects. Instead, OVERPAYMENT is used. As for the forced bank results, 
there are panels representing regressions for both raw (panel A) and mean adjusted 
returns (panel B) for the two different windows.     
***** Insert Table IX here **** 
The first column of panel A reports the effects of the October 14 
announcement. OVERPAYMENT is clearly positive and significant thus supporting 
the hypothesis that more needy banks benefited more from the TARP announcement. 
Furthermore, the TP coefficient is even larger than for forced banks. Specifically, the 
estimation is that TP stockholders receive 15% greater returns than NTP 
stockholders. Clearly the hypothesis that the priority rule was strong on October 14 
for non-forced banks is supported. In contrast to forced banks, maturity is not 
significant.   
The second column of panel A (approval date as opposed to October 14) 
reports that OVERPAYMENT is also significant on the approval date although the 
coefficient is less than half of the October 14 estimation. Nonetheless, this is further 
evidence that weaker banks benefited more from TARP upon announcement of 
approval. In contrast to the October 14 window, TP is not significant. Thus, the 
priority effect on approval date does not appear significant for this window. As in the 
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first column, maturity is not significant. The results for mean adjusted returns (panel 
B) are very similar to the raw returns (panel A). 
Thus, the main results are consistent with our hypothesis that the non-forced 
banks enjoyed higher returns for TP than NTP on October 14 but not their approval 
dates. In addition, supporting hypothesis 2, we find strong evidence that 
OVERPAYMENT affected preferred stock return on October 14 and, also, the 
approval day. 24As for forced banks, numerous other variables were used in the 
regression to test for effects on returns. For example, we used Tier 1 capital. 
However, as for forced regressions, none of the additional variables were significant 
in additional estimations. 
 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
   The 2008 TARP program to stabilize the financial system resulted in large 
issuances of preferred stock by numerous banks. We examine the impact upon the 
valuation of existing preferred stock for two groups of banks: large forced banks and 
smaller non-forced banks.    The forced group provided evidence that TP stock 
experienced higher returns relative to NTP stock for the October 14 TARP 
announcement, consistent with the priority rule. TP stock appears to have benefited 
more from the TARP preferred issuance than NTP stock because the TARP issuance 
provided an additional asset base for the TP. Any potential greater reduction in 
default risk for NTP was not strong enough to dominate this effect.  
                                                          
24
 As shown in a previous table, all non-forced observations were callable. 
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   For non-forced banks it appears that the market expected some banks to apply 
for and receive TARP upon the October 14 announcement. In addition, the evidence 
regarding non-forced pooled preferred stock is that there was a positive return for the 
announcement of approval to issue TARP preferred. The market seems to have 
perceived application and approval to issue TARP preferred as favorable information 
for preferred stockholders even though government interference in bank ownership 
concerned many investors.  
  In summary, TARP benefited some investor groups more than other investor 
groups. Existing preferred stockholders of more voluntary banks likely enjoyed 
higher returns than those of involuntary banks. This might explain why Wells Fargo 
chairman Richard Kovacevich said that Wells Fargo, which was classified as one of 
the involuntary banks in the sample, would not have issued TARP preferred if Wells 
Fargo had not been forced to.  
  In addition, it seems likely that TARP transferred wealth from one group to 
another group. Our results are consistent with the perception of government 
overpayment for preferred stock. In other words, TARP transferred wealth from 
taxpayers to preferred shareholders. Taxpayers seemed to specially subsidize 
preferred stockholders of selected weaker banks.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF SHARE OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ON EX-DIVIDEND 
DAY STOCK PRICE BEHAVIOR 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The question of whether firms derive value from investment banking 
relationships has received considerable attention in the literature, especially since the 
increasingly competitive market for investment banking services would suggest that 
firms can switch investment banks costlessly. Extant research has failed to come up 
with an unambiguous answer, due in part to the difficulty in measuring the value of 
relationship capital.  
Elton and Gruber (1970) assume that one particular tax clientele sets the ex-
day prices and argue that the marginal investor that sets the ex-day prices is the long-
term individual investor. According to the tax-based theory, the average price drop 
on the ex-dividend day should be less than the dividend amount because individual 
investors likely face a tax disadvantage on dividends relative to capital gains. 
However, the short-term trading theory argues that the ex-day pricing of dividends is 
determined by short-term traders who engage in a practice referred to as dividend 
capturing. As long as there are any short-term traders, such as institutions, who do 
not face a tax disadvantage on dividends relative to capital gains, those short-term 
traders would buy stocks prior to the ex-dividend day and sell them afterwards to 
capture dividends.  
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On the other hand, Michaely and Vila (1995) propose a dynamic equilibrium 
model in which investors with different relative tax rates between dividends and 
capital gains trade with each other around the ex-dividend day. The dynamic trading 
clientele theory argues that the ex-day price drop is determined by the interaction of 
investors with different relative tax rates between dividends and capital gains. 
Extending the dynamic trading clientele theory, Dhaliwal and Li (2006) find that the 
proportion of the firm’s stock held by institutions has an effect on ex-dividend day 
stock behavior. However, their empirical work is restricted to the effect of ownership 
structure on ex-dividend day trading volume, not the ex-day price drop itself.  
Despite the possibility that share ownership structure could affect the ex-day 
pricing of dividends, there is surprisingly little empirical work regarding the impact 
of share ownership structure on the ex-day pricing of dividends. One exception is 
Perez-Gonzales (2003), who classifies firms into two groups based on whether their 
largest shareholder is an individual or an institution and investigates whether the ex-
day pricing of dividends is different across the two groups. 25  However, his 
classification of share ownership structure is too broad to reflect the cross-sectional 
variation in share ownership structure. In addition, he implicitly assumes that the 
marginal investor is the largest shareholder even though a firm’s stock held by the 
largest shareholder accounts for on average 16.7 percent of the outstanding stock in 
1994 belonging to the sample period. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the ex-day pricing of 
dividends is affected by the proportion of the firm’s stock held by individuals versus 
                                                          
25
 His classification of share ownership structure is based on firms’ proxy statements in 1994. 
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institutions. Specifically, the proportion of the firm’s stock held by individuals 
versus institutions is defined as the number of shares held by individuals divided by 
the total number of shares outstanding versus the number of shares held by 
institutions divided by the total number of shares outstanding. I explore two 
questions where the ex-day price drop varies with the firm-specific share ownership 
structure. First, I examine whether the level of individual ownership decreases the 
ex-day price drop because individual investors likely have a tax disadvantage on 
dividends. Second, I also examine whether investor heterogeneity, defined as the 
product of the proportion of the firm’s stock held by individual investors and the 
proportion held by institutional investors, is associated with the level of dividend 
capture, thus affecting the ex-day price drop.        
Elton and Gruber (1970) model the ex-day premium as follows: 
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where BP  is the closing price on the cum-dividend day, AP  is the closing price on the 
ex-dividend day, D is the amount of the dividend, dt is the personal tax rate on 
dividends of the marginal investor, and  gt is the personal tax rate on capital gains of 
the marginal investor. In their model and this paper, ( dt−1 ) / ( gt−1 ) is referred to as 
the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital gains. This ratio 
reflects the value of $1 of dividends relative to $1 of capital gains, thereby 
representing the tax preference of dividends relative to capital gains.  
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The first question is whether a firm with a higher level of individual 
ownership shows a lower ex-day premium because of the unfavorable taxation of 
dividends relative to capital gains for individual investors. As discussed in Dhaliwal 
and Li (2006), the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital gains 
for individual investors has been less on average than that for institutional investors. 
The marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital gains has been 
generally less than one for individual investors.26 On the other hand, it has been 
greater than or equal to one for most institutional investors.27 In addition, as pointed 
by Chay, Choi, and Pontiff (2006), individual investors value $1 of dividends lower 
than $1 of unrealized capital gains since taxes on capital gains are deferred until the 
assets are sold. Therefore, I hypothesize that the cross-sectional variation in the ex-
day premium is negatively related to the level of individual ownership.  
The second question is whether the firm specific degree of investor 
heterogeneity increases the ex-day premium by increasing dividend capture on the 
cum-day and the ex-day. According to Dhaliwal and Li (2006), investor 
heterogeneity can be expressed as the product of the proportion of the firm’s stock 
held by individual investors and the proportion held by institutional investors. They 
                                                          
26
 Dhaliwal, Krull, Li, and Moser (2005) report that individual income tax rates on dividends vary 
between 28% and 70% from 1980 to 2001 while individual income tax rates on capital gains vary 
between 20% and 33%. 
27
 According to Dhaliwal et al. (2005), the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital 
gains for non-corporate short-term traders such as brokerage firms and pension funds is one. On the 
other hand, the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital gains for corporate short-
term traders is greater than one because U.S. corporations are allowed to exclude taxes on at least 70 
percent of dividends. However, to be eligible for this dividend deduction, they must hold the stock for 
a certain period of time. The risk involved in holding the stock for this time period likely reduces the 
role played by corporations with the highest marginal rate of substitution between capital gains and 
dividends in determining the ex-day premium. That is, without the minimum holding period, 
corporations could play a more dominant role in determining the ex-day pricing of dividends.    
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argue that ex-dividend day excess trading volume is driven by different relative tax 
rates on dividends and capital gains for individual and institutional investors. They 
also point out that ex-dividend day excess trading volume must be concurrent with 
tax-induced investor heterogeneity. If most investors belong to the same tax 
category, ex-day excess trading volume should be weak and difficult to observe in 
spite of the difference in relative tax rates between dividends and capital gains for 
individual and institutional investors. They document that the effect of dividend 
yield on ex-day excess trading volume is a concave function of the level of 
institutional ownership, implying that it increases with the degree of investor 
heterogeneity.  
However, no existing studies have investigated whether tax-induced investor 
heterogeneity also affects the ex-day premium. Individual investors likely receive 
unfavorable tax treatment of dividends while institutional investors likely receive 
favorable tax treatment of dividends. Without dividend capture by institutional 
investors, the ex-day premium would be determined by individual investors whose 
marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital gains is expected to be 
lower than that for institutional investors (Karpoff and Walkling (1988) and Karpoff 
and Walkling (1990)). If this is the case, the ex-day premium would reflect the 
marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital gains for individual 
investors, resulting in a relatively low ex-day premium. However, the short-term 
trading theory argues dividend capture by institutional investors plays a determining 
role in setting the ex-day price drop. Given that institutional investors do not face the 
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tax disadvantage on dividends relative to capital gains that individual investors likely 
face, the short-term trading theory predicts that a high degree of investor 
heterogeneity results in a high level of dividend capture, thereby increasing the ex-
day premium.  
I find that ownership structure plays an important role in explaining ex-
dividend stock price behavior. The firm-specific share ownership structure affects 
the ex-day premium in various ways. Consistent with the tax-based theory and the 
dynamic trading clientele theory, the cross-sectional variation in the ex-day premium 
is negatively related to the level of individual ownership. Consistent with the short-
term trading theory, the ex-day premium increases with the firm-specific degree of 
investor heterogeneity. Further, the positive relationship between investor 
heterogeneity and the ex-day premium is more significant for high dividend yield 
stocks. Finally, the positive effect of investor heterogeneity seems to be greater than 
the negative effect of the level of individual ownership, especially for high dividend 
yield stocks. In addition, I find that the ex-day premium is positively related to the 
ex-day excess trading volume, which suggests that dividend capture by institutional 
investors increases the ex-day price drop. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 develops the 
hypotheses of the effect of share ownership structure on the ex-day premium. Section 
2 describes data and methodology. Empirical results are provided in Section 3 and 
Section 4 concludes. 
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II. Hypotheses 
Both the tax-based theory and the short-term trading theory agree that the 
marginal investor determines the ex-day pricing of dividends. The tax-based 
hypothesis argues that investors in high tax brackets tend to hold low dividend yield 
stocks while investors in low tax brackets tend to hold high dividend yield stocks. 
According to this theory, the change in the price when the stock goes ex-dividend is 
determined by the dividend and capital gains tax rates faced by the long-term 
individual investor. The ex-day premium should be less than one because individual 
investors likely face a tax disadvantage on dividends relative to capital gains. 
However, Kalay (1982) challenges the tax-based theory by showing that tax 
arbitrage occurs if transaction costs are low enough. The short-term trading theory 
argues that the existence of transaction costs explains why the average price drop on 
the ex-dividend day is less than the dividend amount.   
An alternative theory, the dynamic trading clientele theory argues that the ex-
day premium is the result of the interaction of traders with different relative tax rates 
between dividends and capital gains. Michaely and Murgia (1995) and Michaely and 
Vila (1995) model the ex-day premium as follows: 
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Where )(PREME is the expected ex-day premium,
 
cP  is the cum-dividend 
day price, eP  is the ex-dividend day price, iα  is the marginal rate of substitution 
between dividends and capital gains for trader i , iK  is the tax-adjusted risk 
tolerance for trader i , α is the average of iα  weighted by iK , D is the amount of the 
dividend, and v  is the risk premium.  
According to equation (2), the expected ex-day premium consists of two 
parts: the average of the marginal rates of substitution between dividends and capital 
gains for the various trading groups, weighted by their risk tolerance (α ) and the 
risk involved in the ex-day trading (
cPD
v
/
). However, given that reliable data on 
who trades on the ex-dividend day is unavailable, it is almost impossible to directly 
test equation (2).  
A. Effect of the Level of Individual Ownership on the Ex-Day Premium  
Consider two firms with different share ownership structures. Suppose for 
firm A, 30% of shares are owned by individual investors and 70% of shares by 
institutional investors, while for firm B, 70% of shares are owned by individual 
investors and 30% of shares by institutional investors. Assume that because of the 
different tax regimes faced by institutions and individuals, the marginal rate of 
substitution between dividends and capital gains is lower for individual investors 
than for institutional investors. If the proportion of the firm’s stock held by 
individual investors proxies for the likelihood that the long-term individual investor 
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sets the ex-day price drop, the ex-day premium for firm B is likely to be lower than 
that for firm A.  
Table X presents stylized marginal rates of substitution between dividends 
and capital gains for the various holding groups before and after the 2003 dividend 
tax cut based on taxes faced by investors in the highest tax brackets.28 Although 
Table X shows different marginal rates of substitution between dividends and capital 
gains for non-corporate institutional investors and corporate investors, I assume 
homogeneity within institutional investors. The reason for this assumption is that 
there is no reliable data on institutional owner classifications based on different tax 
treatments.29  
***** Insert Table X here **** 
Table X shows 0.77 and 1.00 as the marginal rates of substitution between 
dividends and capital gains for the individual investor before and after 2003, 
respectively. However, the actual marginal rates of substitution between dividends 
and capital gains for the individual investor are likely lower than 0.77 and 1.00 
because taxes on capital gains are deferred until the assets are sold.30 Therefore, 
individual investors are expected to receive unfavorable tax treatment of dividends 
                                                          
28
  For simplicity, pension funds are assumed to represent non-corporate institutional investors.  
29
 Dhaliwal et al. (2005) investigate whether the level of tax-advantaged institutional ownership 
affects the implied cost of equity capital. Using CDA Spectrum institutional owner classifications, 
they attempt to divide institutional owners into five groups: banks, insurance companies, mutual 
funds, brokerage firms, and others (pensions and endowments). However, they find little evidence that 
the effect of institutional ownership on the implied cost of equity capital varies according to the 
institutional owner classifications. They attribute their results to the fact that CDA Spectrum 
institutional owner classifications are not based on different tax treatments. 
30
 Zhang, Farrell and Brown (2008) report that the ex-day premium was significantly lower than one 
during 2004-2005. They suggest that individual investors’ ability to defer capital gains might lead the 
ex-day premium to be lower than one after the 2003 tax cut.  
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relative to institutional investors even after the 2003 tax cut. Since individual 
investors likely receive unfavorable tax treatment of dividends, the tax-based theory 
predicts that there should be a negative relationship between the level of individual 
ownership and the ex-day premium. This leads to the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: The ex-day premium of a firm’s stock is negatively related to the 
proportion of that stock held by individual investors. 
As discussed earlier, since reliable data on who trades on the ex-dividend day 
is unavailable, it is almost impossible to directly test whether the dynamic trading 
clientele theory could explain the ex-day premium. As pointed out by Li (2005), 
those investors who hold the stock prior to the ex-day do not necessarily trade 
around the ex-day while those investors who do not hold stocks prior to the ex-day 
may trade around the ex-day. Nevertheless, Dhaliwal and Li (2006) document that 
the proportion of the firm’s stock held by individuals versus institutions are 
correlated with the proportion of trading by individuals versus institutions around ex-
dividend days.31 If the level of individual ownership versus institutional ownership is 
a proxy for the level of trading by individuals versus institutions around ex-days, the 
dynamic trading clientele theory predicts the same results as predicted by hypothesis 
1.  
                                                          
31
 Since investor heterogeneity can be expressed as a concave function of institutional ownership, 
Dhaliwal and Li (2006) use the number of shares held by institutions divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding as a holding-based proxy for investor heterogeneity. Their implicit assumption is 
that most trade around the ex-days occurs between existing holders of the stock. Of course traders 
who are not existing holders of the stock trade around the ex-days. To examine whether the level of 
institutional ownership is correlated with the level of trading by institutions around ex-days, they use 
the ratio of the number of large trades to the number of all trades as a trading –based proxy for 
investor heterogeneity. They find that the holding-based proxy and the trading-based proxy are 
correlated.  
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As expressed by equation (2), the dynamic trading clientele theory argues 
that the ex-day premium increases as α  increases. Assuming homogeneity within 
individual investors and, also, within institutional investors, α  is expressed as 
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where indn is the number of individual traders, insn  is the number of institutional 
traders, indα  is the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital gains 
for individual traders, insα  is the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and 
capital gains for institutional traders, indK  is the tax-adjusted risk tolerance for 
individual traders, insK  is the tax-adjusted risk tolerance for institutional traders, indw  
is the weight placed on the individual traders, and indw  is the weight placed on 
institutional traders. 
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Since the actual marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital gains for 
individual investors ( indα ) is likely lower than that for institutional investors ( insα ), 
( insind αα − ) in equation (4) is expected to be negative, leading to a negative 
indn
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. Therefore, equation (4) suggests that the ex-day premium is negatively 
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related to the proportion held by individual investors, which is consistent with 
hypothesis 1.  As suggested by equation (4), to the extent that the level of individual 
ownership versus institutional ownership proxies for the level of trading by 
individuals versus institutions around ex-days, hypothesis 1 is also consistent with 
the dynamic trading clientele theory.   
B. Effect of Investor Heterogeneity on the Ex-Day Premium  
As long as individual investors face a tax disadvantage on dividends relative 
to capital gains while institutional investors do not, individual investors who trade 
for reasons unrelated to the dividend may time their trades in such a way as to avoid 
holding the stock on the cum-dividend day; on the other hand, institutional investors 
most likely engage in dividend capture. Such a different valuation of dividends 
between individual investors and institutional investors is expected to motivate 
trading between individuals and institutions around the ex-day. 
Defining investor heterogeneity as the product of the proportion of the firm’s 
stock held by individual investors and the proportion held by institutional investors, I 
hypothesize that investor heterogeneity is positively associated with the ex-day 
premium. As mentioned earlier, Dhaliwal and Li (2006) document that the effect of 
dividend yield on ex-day excess trading volume first increases and then decreases 
with the level of institutional ownership, suggesting that dividend capture is 
associated with the degree of investor heterogeneity. 
If dividend capture does not occur, the ex-day premium should be lower, 
reflecting the marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital gains for 
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individual investors. However, the short-term trading theory argues that the ex-day 
premium is determined by short-term traders who engage in dividend capture. Since 
the actual marginal rate of substitution between dividends and capital gains for short-
term traders is likely greater than that for individual investors, the short-term trading 
theory predicts that the ex-day premium should increase as dividend capture 
increases. Therefore, I hypothesize that a high level of dividend capture resulting 
from a high degree of investor heterogeneity increases the ex-day premium.  
Hypothesis 2: The ex-day premium of a firm’s stock is positively related to the 
degree of investor heterogeneity.  
It should be noted that hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 are not mutually 
exclusive, but both hypotheses can hold. Consider three firms with different share 
ownership structures. Suppose for firm A, 30% of shares are owned by individual 
investors and 70% of shares by institutional investors, for firm B, 50% of shares are 
owned by individual investors and 50% of shares by institutional investors, and for 
firm C, 70% of shares are owned by individual investors and 30% of shares by 
institutional investors. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the ex-day premium is negatively 
associated with the proportion held by individual investors. If hypothesis 1 holds, the 
ex-day premium for firm A is the highest and the ex-day premium for firm C is the 
lowest. On the other hand, hypothesis 2 predicts that the ex-day premium is 
positively associated with the degree of investor heterogeneity. Since the degree of 
investor heterogeneity is a concave function of the level of individual ownership, 
hypothesis 2 predicts that the ex-day premium for firm B is the highest and the ex-
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day premiums for firm A and firm C are the same. However, if both hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 2 hold, the ex-day premium should be highest for firm A or firm B while 
it should be lowest for firm C.   
Relative to hypothesis 3, given below, I compare the hypothesized positive 
relationship between the degree of investor heterogeneity and the ex-day premium 
for high dividend yield stocks and that for low dividend yield stocks. Institutional 
investors are more motivated to capture dividends for high dividend yield stocks 
around ex-days because the benefits of dividend capture are greater for high dividend 
yield stocks. On the other hand, institutional investors are less likely to engage in 
dividend capture for low dividend yield stocks because the marginal cost of engaging 
in dividend capture is expected to be greater than the marginal benefit. As a result, a 
high degree of investor heterogeneity is more likely to increase the level of dividend 
capture and therefore increase the ex-day premium for high dividend yield stocks. If 
a firm’s stock is associated with a higher degree of investor heterogeneity, but the 
dividend yield of that stock is low, the hypothesized positive effect of investor 
heterogeneity on the ex-day premium is likely weaker for that stock than for a high 
dividend yield stock associated with a higher degree of investor heterogeneity. This 
leads to the third hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: The hypothesized positive relationship between the degree of investor 
heterogeneity and the ex-day premium is more significant for high dividend yield 
stocks.  
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Many studies show that the excess trading volume around the ex-dividend 
day is significant.32 However, none to the author’s knowledge have explored whether 
the excess trading volume increases the ex-day premium. If hypothesis 2 and 
hypothesis 3 hold, a high level of dividend capture should increase the ex-day 
premium. Since excess trading volume around ex-dividend days indicates more 
dividend capture, a positive relationship between excess trading volume and ex-day 
premium is expected. This leads to the fourth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: The ex-day premium is positively related to the ex-day excess volume.  
C. Other Explanatory Variables  
The control variables used to explain the ex-day premium based on the tax-
based theory are the dividend yield, the 2003 tax cut, and the interaction between the 
dividend yield and the 2003 tax cut. The tax-based theory argues that investors in 
high tax brackets tend to prefer low dividend yield stocks. Since the ex-day premium 
reflects the marginal rates of substitution between dividends and capital gains, the 
ex-day premium should increase with the dividend yield. A positive relationship 
between the dividend yield and the ex-day premium is expected.  
Previous studies have investigated the effect of tax changes on the ex-day 
pricing of dividends. Poterba and Summers (1984) study the British market during 
different tax regimes and conclude that taxes determine the ex-dividend day stock 
price behavior. Barclay (1987) focuses on the enactment of the federal income tax in 
1913. By finding that the ex-day premium is not less than one before 1913 and the 
                                                          
32
 See Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), Kato and Lowenstein (1995), and Michaely and Vila 
(1996).   
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ex-day premium is less than one during the period 1962 to 1985, he lends support to 
the tax-based theory. The 2003 tax cut reduced the tax disadvantage of dividends 
relative to capital gains and therefore increased the marginal rate of substitution 
between dividends and capital gains for individual investors. 33  The tax-based theory 
predicts that the 2003 tax cut should increase the ex-day premium. I also include an 
interaction term between dividend yield and the 2003 tax cut. Zhang et al. (2008) 
hypothesize that the effect of the dividend yield on the ex-day premium weakens 
after the 2003 tax cut since the 2003 tax cut reduced tax heterogeneity among 
investors. Therefore, the interaction term between yield and the 2003 tax cut is 
expected to be negatively related to the ex-day premium.  
The control variables used to explain the ex-day premium based on the short-
term trading theory are the dividend yield, transaction costs, and risk exposure. The 
short-term trading theory predicts that the ex-day premium should increase with the 
dividend yield since high dividend yield stocks make dividend capture more 
profitable. Several studies document that the ex-day premium increases with the 
dividend yield.34  
According to the short-term trading hypothesis, dividend capture should be 
negatively related to transaction costs and risk involved in the transaction because 
those factors are likely frictions to trade around ex-dividend days. Michaely and Vila 
                                                          
33
 The 2003 tax cut reduced the maximum tax rate on dividend income of individual investors from 
38.6% to 15% and reduced the maximum tax rate on capital gains income of individual investors from 
20% to 15%. On the other hand, the 2003 tax cut left the tax rates for institutional investors 
unchanged. 
34
 Elton and Gruber (1970), Kalay (1982), and Michaely (1991) find that the ex-day premium is 
positively related to the dividend yield. Naranjo, Nimalendran, and Ryngaert (2000) find that the ex-
day abnormal returns are negatively related to the dividend yield, implying a positive relationship 
between the dividend yield and the ex-day premium.  
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(1996) find that the trading volume around ex-dividend days decreases with 
transaction costs and risk exposure. Naranjo et al. (2000) also find that higher 
transaction costs and higher risk discourage dividend capture by corporate traders. 
Boyd and Jagannathan (1994) show that risk exposure reduces dividend capture 
trading. If the level of dividend capture trading is positively associated with the ex-
day premium, transaction costs and risk exposure that discourage the short-term 
trader from trading around ex-dividend days should decrease the ex-day premium. 
More directly, Karpoff and Walkling (1990) find transaction costs are negatively 
related to the ex-day premium. Grammatikos (1989) investigates the effect of the 
1984 Tax Reform Act, whose purpose was to increase the risk of short-term trading 
of taxable corporations. He finds that the 1984 Tax Reform Act deterred short-term 
trading, leading to a decrease in the ex-day premium. 
On the other hand, the dynamic trading clientele model allows for the role 
played by both long-term individual traders and short-term traders in determining the 
ex-day premium. Specifically, in the dynamic trading clientele model, the ex-day 
premium is influenced by different tax rates among traders, the dividend yield, 
transaction costs, and the risk involved in the transaction. Therefore, it should be 
noted that the expected relationships between explanatory variables above and the 
ex-day premium from either the tax-based theory or the short-term trading theory 
reconcile with the dynamic trading clientele theory. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
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The common stock data is obtained from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). I collect data from February 1, 2001 to December 31, 2007. Zhang et 
al. (2008) exclude year 2003 from their sample since there might be a lag in 
investors’ decisions on their portfolios. Thus, following Zhang et al. (2008), I 
exclude year 2003 from my sample. Following Zhang et al. (2008), I collect data 
from February 1, 2001. All NYSE stocks had converted their price quotations from 
$1/16 ticks to decimals by the end of January 2001.35  I examine firms that pay 
taxable cash dividends (CRSP distribution codes 1222, 1232, 1242, and 1252). Ex-
dividend day events are included in the sample if trading occurs on both the cum-
dividend day and the ex-dividend day. I exclude ADRs and REITs because of their 
different tax treatment. Ex-dividend day events are excluded from the sample if the 
price is less than five dollars.36 In addition, following Chetty, Rosenberg, and Saez 
(2007), ex-dividend day events are excluded from the sample if the dividend yield is 
less than 0.1%.  
Furthermore, I require each ex-dividend day event for a given quarter to have 
data on the level of institutional ownership at the end of the preceding quarter. 
Institution investors with more than $100 million are required to file form 13f and 
13f filings are obtained from Thomson Financial. 37  The firm-specific level of 
institutional ownership is calculated by dividing the number of shares held by 
                                                          
35
 See Graham, Michaely, and Roberts (2003) and Jakob and Ma (2004) 
36
 Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2005) eliminate observations with prices below five dollars from the 
sample because low priced securities are associated with the relatively high ratio of the bid-ask spread 
to the dividend.  
37
 Institutional investors include banks, insurance companies, brokerage firms, investment advisors, 
mutual funds, and others (pension funds, university endowments, and foundations).  
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institutions by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of each quarter; the 
firm-specific level of individual ownership is calculated by subtracting the firm-
specific level of institutional ownership from one. Each firm’s institutional holdings 
are obtained for a total of 24 quarters (year 2001-2002 and year 2004-2007). 
Matching ex-dividend day event data for a given quarter with ownership data at the 
end of the preceding quarter results in 34,559 observations.  
Following Michaely (1991), I adjust the ex-dividend day closing price by the 
daily expected return, estimated by the OLS market model.38 The ex-day premium 
for each ex-day observation is calculated as follows: 
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where BiP,  is the closing price on the cum-dividend day, AiP,  is the closing price on 
the ex-dividend day,  )( iRE
 
is the expected daily return estimated by the OLS 
market model, and iD  is the amount of the dividend. I use [-45,-6] and [6,45], where 
Day 0 is the ex-dividend day, to estimate the market model for each observation. The 
market return is obtained from the CRSP value-weighted portfolio including 
dividends.  
In addition, following Michaely (1991), I correct for heteroskedasticity that 
the preceding statistic suffers from.39 There are two sources of heteroskedasticity: the 
                                                          
38
 Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2005) point out that the opening price on the ex-dividend day is biased 
because a market order on the ex-dividend day is adjusted by the amount of the dividend. Therefore, I 
use the ex-dividend day closing price by adjusting it by the market movement on the ex-dividend day.  
39
 Following Michaely (1991), Wu and Hsu (1996), Chay et al. (2006), and Zhang et al. (2008) correct 
for heteroskedasticity.  
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stock specific variance and the dividend yield. Michaely (1991) shows that the 
heteroskedasticity is negatively related to the stock specific variance and positively 
related to the dividend yield. Therefore, for a regression analysis, weighted least 
squares are employed to correct for heteroskedasticity by using the ratio of the 
squared dividend yield to the residual variance obtained from the OLS market model. 
Following Graham, Michaely, and Roberts (2003), I trim the data at the upper and 
lower 2.5 percent level of the premium distribution to avoid the effect of outliers on 
the results.40 
Following Michaely and Vila (1995), I estimate the ex-dividend day excess 
trading volume. First, I calculate the average daily turnover during the 80-day 
estimation period:
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where itTO is the daily turnover for security i on day t. Second, I calculate the excess 
trading volume for each day in the event period [-5,+5]: 
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Then, the average daily excess trading volume for each ex-dividend day observation 
is calculated as 
                                                          
40
 Alternatively, I winsorize the data at the same level of the premium distribution. Winsorizing the 
data has no impact on the results.     
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IV. Empirical Results 
To investigate the relationship between share ownership structure and the ex-
day premium, I divide the sample into deciles according to the level of individual 
ownership. Decile 1 consists of the lowest level of individual ownership and decile 
10 consists of the highest level of individual ownership. For each decile, the mean 
ex-day premium is computed. Table XI shows that the ex-day premiums from decile 
1 to decile 6 are greater than the ex-day premiums from decile 7 to decile 10. In 
addition, in the higher level of individual ownership (from decile 7 to decile 10), the 
ex-day premium decreases with the level of individual ownership. This is consistent 
with what will occur if both hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 are true.  
***** Insert Table XI here **** 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that there is a negative relationship between the level 
of individual ownership and the ex-day premium. On the other hand, hypothesis 2 
predicts that the ex-day premium is positively related to the degree of investor 
heterogeneity. The measure of investor heterogeneity is expressed as:   
                             )1(** INDINDINSINDHETERO −==                             (9) 
where IND
 
is measured as the number of shares held by individual investors divided 
by the total number of shares outstanding and INS
 
is measured as the number of 
shares held by institutional investors divided by the total number of shares 
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outstanding. Since the degree of investor heterogeneity is a concave function of the 
level of individual ownership, hypothesis 2 predicts that the ex-day premium first 
increases and then decreases with the level of individual ownership. If both 
hypotheses hold, the ex-day premium should be greater in the lower and middle level 
of individual ownership than in the higher level of individual ownership. Further, the 
ex-day premium should decrease with the level of individual ownership in the higher 
level of individual ownership. Therefore, the results in Table XI appear to support 
hypothesis 2 as well as hypothesis 1.  
Next I turn to evidence in the cross-sectional regression results with respect 
to determinants of the relationship between ownership structure and the ex-day 
premium. The variables that are expected to affect the ex-day premium include the 
dividend yield, the level of individual ownership, the degree of investor 
heterogeneity, the 2003 tax cut, transaction costs, risk involved in the transaction, the 
interaction between the dividend yield and the 2003 tax cut, the interaction between 
the level of individual ownership and the 2003 tax cut, and the interaction between 
investor heterogeneity and the dividend yield. The following cross-sectional 
regression is employed with some variables omitted for various specifications:
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where for each ex-day observation, iPREM is the ex-day premium, iYIELD is 
measured as the amount of the dividend divided by the cum-day price, iT 2003 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation falls in a year after 2003, 
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iIND is defined as the number of shares held by individual investors divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding, iHETERO is defined as the product of the 
number of shares held by individual investors divided by the total number of shares 
outstanding and the number of shares held by institutional investors divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding, iEXVOL is defined as the difference between the 
average daily turnover (the ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding) during the 
11-day event period [-5,5] and the average daily turnover during the 80-day 
estimation period [-45,-6] and [6,45], divided by the average daily turnover during 
the 80-day estimation period, iTC , transaction costs, is measured by dividing one by 
the cum-day price, and iRISK is calculated by dividing the stock return variance by 
the market return variance during the estimation period [-45,-6] and [6,45].41   
Table XII presents summary statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables. The mean ex-day premium is 0.6594 which is lower than 1.00. This is 
consistent with both the tax-based theory and the short-term trading theory. 
According to the tax-based theory, individual investors should value dividends less 
than capital gains before the 2003 tax cut because of the adverse tax treatment of 
long-term individual investors’ dividend income. Due to individual investors’ ability 
to defer their capital gains until the assets are sold, individual investors most likely 
value dividends less than capital gains even after the 2003 tax cut, which reduced the 
                                                          
41
 Karpoff and Walkling (1988) and Naranjo et al. (2000) use the inverse of the stock price as a 
measure of transaction costs. They argue that the inverse of the stock price is positively related to bid-
ask spreads and brokerage commissions. Following Naranjo et al. (2000), I use the ratio of the stock 
return variance to the market return variance as a measure of risk involved in the transaction.    
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tax disadvantage of dividends relative to capital gains for individual investors. On 
the other hand, the short-term trading theory argues that the existence of transactions 
costs results in an ex-day premium less than one.  
***** Insert Table XII here **** 
In order to test whether the expected positive relationship between the degree 
of investor heterogeneity and the ex-day premium is more significant for high 
dividend yield stocks, I divide the sample into two groups: high dividend yield 
stocks and non-high dividend yield stocks. Observations are sorted into three 
dividend yield quantiles. Stocks in the highest dividend yield quantile are defined as 
high dividend yield stocks and stocks in the other two dividend yield quantiles are 
defined as non-high dividend yield stocks. I then run separate regressions for high 
dividend yield stocks and non-high dividend yield stocks.  
The regression results are presented in Panel A of Table XIII where weighted 
least squares estimation procedures are employed. All the regression results in this 
paper are based on weighted least squares estimation procedures. The coefficient on 
IND is significantly negative, which suggests that the proportion of the firm’s stock 
held by individuals is negatively related to the ex-day premium due to unfavorable 
tax treatment of long-term individual investors’ dividend income. This result is 
consistent with both the tax-based theory and the dynamic trading clientele theory. 
The coefficient on HETERO is positive, which is expected if a high degree of 
investor heterogeneity that is expected to increase dividend capture is positively 
associated with the ex-day premium. This result is consistent with the short-term 
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trading theory. On the other hand, one cannot expect the sign on HETERO to be 
positive from either the tax-based theory or the dynamic trading clientele model 
expressed by equation (2). The coefficient and t-stat on HETERO seem to be more 
significant for high dividend yield stocks than those for non-high dividend yield 
stocks, as predicted by the short-term trading theory. It appears that the positive 
relationship between investor heterogeneity and the ex-day premium is more 
significant for high dividend yield stocks because dividend capture occurs more for 
high dividend yield stocks.  
***** Insert Table XIII here **** 
The estimated coefficients on other explanatory variables are also as 
predicted. If investors in high tax brackets are more likely to hold low dividend yield 
stocks and investors in low tax brackets are more likely to hold high dividend yield 
stocks, a positive relationship between the dividend yield and the ex-day premium is 
expected. Consistent with the tax-based theory, the coefficient on YIELD is positive 
and significant. The positive relationship between the dividend yield and the ex-day 
premium is also consistent with the short-term trading hypothesis because the 
existence of transaction costs leads to the positive relationship between the dividend 
yield and the ex-day premium. As documented by Chetty et al.  (2007) and Zhang et 
al. (2008), T2003 is positively related to the ex-day premium, suggesting that the 
reduction in the tax disadvantage of dividends relative to capital gains for individual 
investors increased the ex-day premium after the 2003 tax cut. TC is negatively and 
significantly correlated with the ex-day premium, consistent with the short-term 
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trading theory. RISK is marginally significant (10% level) for the full sample. Since 
the dynamic trading clientele model argues that the interaction of long-term 
individual traders and short-term traders plays a role in determining the ex-day 
premium, it should be noted that the signs of coefficients on other explanatory 
variables above, predicted by either the tax-based theory or the short-term trading 
theory, reconcile with the dynamic trading clientele theory.    
To gain further insight into the relationship between ownership structure and 
the ex-day premium, I compare the negative effect of individual ownership on the 
ex-day premium and the positive effect of investor heterogeneity on the ex-day 
premium. Since HETERO is a concave function of the level of individual ownership, 
expressed as IND*(1-IND), I decompose HETERO into IND and IND2 and run 
regressions. The sign of the coefficient on IND is expected to indicate which 
hypothesis dominates the ex-day pricing of dividends. If the tax-based hypothesis or 
the dynamic trading clientele hypothesis dominates, the coefficient on IND should be 
negative; if the short-term trading hypothesis dominates, the coefficient on IND 
should be positive.  
The results are shown in Panel B of Table XIII where the only change from 
Panel A of Table XIII is that HETERO is decomposed into IND and IND2. The 
coefficient on IND for non-high dividend yield stocks is not significantly different 
from zero. The negative effect of the level of individual ownership on the ex-day 
premium seems to be offset by the positive effect of investor heterogeneity on the 
ex-day premium. However, the coefficient on IND for high dividend yield stocks is 
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significantly positive, suggesting that the short-term trading hypothesis dominates 
the ex-day pricing of dividends for high dividend yield stocks. The coefficient on 
IND for the full sample is also significantly positive, implying that the positive effect 
of investor heterogeneity is greater than the negative effect of the level of individual 
ownership.  
The positive sign on IND is consistent with predictions of the short-term 
trading theory, but inconsistent with predictions of both the tax-based theory and the 
dynamic trading clientele theory. This result is also inconsistent with the findings of 
Perez-Gonzales (2003). He classifies firms into two groups based on whether their 
largest shareholder is an individual or an institution and finds that firms whose 
largest shareholder is an individual show lower ex-day premiums than firms whose 
largest shareholder is an institution. This evidence is consistent with the tax-based 
theory. Since a firm’s stock held by the largest shareholder accounts for an average 
of 16.7 percent of the outstanding stock in 1994 belonging to the earlier sample 
period, his broad classification of share ownership structure into two groups based on 
the ownership characteristics of large shareholders might lead to different results.  
The regression results with interaction terms are shown in Table XIV. The 
signs of most of the coefficients are the same as in Table XIII. The positive sign on 
HETERO*YIELD is consistent with the results in Table XIII. The positive 
relationship between the degree of investor heterogeneity and the ex-day premium is 
greater for high dividend yield stocks probably because the benefits of dividend 
capture increase with the dividend yield. The coefficient on YIELD*T2003 is 
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significantly negative, implying that the reduction in tax heterogeneity among 
investors makes dividend clienteles weaker. This evidence is consistent with the tax-
based theory.  
***** Insert Table XIV here **** 
Finally, I investigate whether the ex-day premium is affected by dividend 
capture. I regress the ex-day premium on the ex-day excess volume, since excess 
trading volume around ex-dividend days indicates more dividend capture. The 
regression results are shown in Table XV. The coefficient on EXVOL is significantly 
positive, indicating that dividend capture by short-term traders increases the ex-day 
premium.      
***** Insert Table XV here **** 
 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper, I examine whether share ownership structure affects the ex-day 
pricing of dividends. The main empirical results are as follows: first, the level of 
individual ownership is negatively related to the ex-dividend day premium and this 
negative relationship weakens when the tax disadvantage of dividends relative to 
capital gains for individual investors is reduced. Second, investor heterogeneity is 
positively associated with the level of dividend capture, thus leading to an increase in 
the ex-day premium. Such an increase in the ex-day premium is positively associated 
with the dividend yield. Finally, the positive effect of investor heterogeneity on the 
ex-day premium seems to be greater than the negative effect of the level of 
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individual ownership on the ex-day premium, especially for high dividend yield 
stocks.  
In summary, as pointed out by Karpoff and Walkling (1988) and Karpoff and 
Walkling (1990), the tax-based theory and the short-term trading theory are not 
mutually exclusive, but are complementary; accordingly, relying on just one theory 
cannot fully explain ex-day stock price behavior. Individual investors are motivated 
to time their trades in order to avoid dividends, resulting in a difference between the 
price drop and the dividend. If dividend capture does not occur, the ex-day premium 
is more likely to reflect the marginal rate of substitution between capital gains and 
dividends for those individual investors, thus resulting in a lower ex-day premium. 
However, if short-term traders find it profitable to exploit the difference between the 
price drop and the dividend, those short-term traders seem to be the price setter on 
the cum-day and the ex-day. The role played by institutional investors in determining 
the ex-day stock price drop depends on trading circumstances under which a firm’s 
stock lies. This is why the ex-day premium increases with the dividend yield and 
investor heterogeneity, while the ex-day premium decreases with transaction costs 
and risk involved in the transaction. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE EFFECT OF INTEREST RATE VOLATILITY ON CORPORATE 
YIELD SPREADS ON BOTH NONCALLABLE AND CALLABLE BONDS42 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The volatility of interest rates plays numerous important roles in finance 
theory and practice. As one example, the potential for significant adverse changes in 
interest rates has caused banks, insurance companies, mutual funds and other 
financial institutions to devise strategies (such as immunization and others) to protect 
their fixed income portfolios.  Sophisticated ways to measure interest rate risk 
exposure such as value at risk (VAR) have been developed.  
The theory of how interest rate volatility affects bond pricing has been 
developed by numerous authors.  For example, advanced bond pricing theory 
includes interest rate volatility as an important factor where a stochastic process for 
continuous changes in the short rate is given in terms of a drift term and a volatility 
term.  Continuous changes in bond prices are derived from the short rate process. 
Veronesi (2010) and others derive the expected bond returns as a function of interest 
rate volatility. In a classic article, Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1990) derive a bond 
pricing model where the drift in the short (forward) rate is, in fact, a function of the 
volatility of short rates.  
Empirical estimations of interest rate volatility have investigated alternative 
specifications of short rate volatility.  For example, classic interest rate theories of 
                                                          
42
 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Duane Stock. 
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Merton  (1973)43 and Vasicek (1977)  suggest short rate volatility is independent of 
the level of interest rates  while others such as Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985), 
Pearson and Sun (1994) and Black and Karasinki (1991) maintain the volatility of 
rates depends on the level of interest rates. Brenner, Harjes and Kroner (1996) have 
found evidence that volatility depends on level of rates and, also, GARCH processes.  
Yield spreads have similarly played numerous important roles in finance 
theory and practice. For example, the spread between long and short rates has been 
of great interest where some think this spread predicts economic growth. More 
relevant to this research, the yield spread between instruments of equal maturity is 
also a topic of great importance. If one considers two equal maturity corporate debt 
instruments, what is the market determined yield spread and what underlying 
features determine this spread? Perhaps the most obvious factor is any differential in 
credit quality (default risk).  However, recently, the importance of other factors has 
also been stressed.  
Duffee (1998), in testing  the Longstaff and Schwarz (1995) model on both 
callable and noncallable bonds, found that a greater level of interest rates suggests a 
stronger growth in firm value and thus  reduces the spread over U. S. Treasury 
bonds.  Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) find that expected default explains 
a surprisingly small part of spreads while a greater portion of the spread is simply 
systematic risk similar to that of equities. Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) find 
default risk does not fully explain spreads and stress that liquidity explains a large 
                                                          
43
 In contrast, the Merton (1974) structural default risk model has no interest rate process, only a firm 
value process. 
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part of corporate bond spreads. Bao, Pan and Wang (2011) find that liquidity is a 
very strong determinant of spreads and, in fact, over-shadows credit risk. However, 
these papers have not addressed the impact of interest rate volatility on yield spreads. 
The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of interest rate 
volatility on corporate yield spreads for both noncallable and callable bonds. 
Specifically, interest rate volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the daily 
one-month Treasury constant maturity rate for the 12 months prior to the bond 
transaction date. We explore two important and broad questions: 1) how does interest 
rate volatility affects yield spread for noncallable corporate bonds? 2) how does the 
effect of interest rate volatility on yield spreads differ for noncallable corporate 
bonds versus callable corporate bonds? While theory suggests that interest rate 
volatility should be priced in corporate yield spreads, surprisingly, there is no 
empirical work testing the effect of interest rate volatility on the above types of yield 
spreads.  
We first investigate the effect of interest rate volatility on yield spreads on 
noncallable bonds. Merton (1974) relates a firm’s default risk to the firm’s asset 
volatility. Many studies have considered a firm’s equity volatility in the investigation 
of the yield spread of its bonds by assuming that a firm’s (total) asset volatility is 
determined by its equity. However, as noted by Campbell and Taksler (2003), the 
asset volatility of a firm with risky debt is determined by both its equity and debt. 
For example, if a firm has a high level of interest rate volatility and therefore a high 
level of debt volatility, the firm is more likely to reach a critical value for default, 
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thereby resulting in a high probability of default. Thus, interest rate volatility should 
be priced in corporate yield spreads.   
Acharya and Carpenter (2002) also provide theoretical support for the 
positive effect of interest rate volatility on noncallable bond spreads. They model a 
defaultable bond where its spread increases with the volatility of the difference 
between the host bond price and the firm value.44 The details of their model are given 
in the theory and hypotheses section.  
We also investigate whether the effect of interest rate volatility on yield 
spreads is greater or smaller for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds. Since 
interest rate volatility affects both default risk reflecting the firm’s option to default 
and call option values, the effect of interest rate volatility on yield spreads is 
complex. We note that default and call options are interactive because, for example, 
a bond default, which tends to be more likely when interest rate volatility is high, 
makes call option value disappear. As a result, the effect of interest rate volatility on 
yield spreads may be smaller for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds. On the 
other hand, interest rate volatility tends to increase call option values because greater 
interest rate volatility increases the volatility of the underlying instrument and thus 
increases the likelihood that the bond price reaches the call price and total spread is 
thus larger with greater interest rate volatility. In sum, the differential effect of 
interest rate volatility on yield spreads for callable bonds is not immediately obvious.  
It is important to understand the importance of callable corporate yield 
spreads. Even though most empirical studies exclude callable bonds from their 
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 The host bond is a coupon paying bond with no default risk. 
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sample, Berndt (2004) reports that as of April, 2003, roughly 60% of U.S. corporate 
bonds in the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) are callable. Acharya and 
Carpenter (2002) point out that practitioners generally quote corporate bond prices as 
yield spreads and most corporate bonds are callable. Therefore, our empirical work 
includes yield spreads of callable corporate bonds.   
We find that interest rate volatility clearly has a strong impact upon 
noncallable bond spreads after controlling for common bond-level, firm-level, and 
macroeconomic variables. This result is robust to using individual issuers’ fixed 
effects and differencing the time-series. For a noncallable bond, a one percent 
increase in interest rate volatility increases the yield spread by a very significant 
amount. We find that this positive effect of interest rate volatility on yield spreads is 
smaller for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds. This result indicates that an 
increase in default risk reduces call option values, which is consistent with Kim, 
Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993), Acharya and Carpenter (2002), and Jacoby 
and Shiller (2010), but is not consistent with King (2002). Also, we find that the 
positive effect of equity volatility on yield spreads is smaller for callable bonds than 
for noncallable bonds. Finally, we find that the average yield spread on callable 
bonds is greater than that on noncallable bonds, supporting the existence of positive 
call spreads. This is inconsistent with Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), who include 
callable bonds in their regressions of yield spreads, but find either negative or 
insignificant call spreads. Also, Ederington and Stock (2002) point out that studies 
on the impact of a call option on corporate bond yields such as Kidwell, Marr, and 
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Thompson (1984) and Fung and Rudd (1986) often find that a call option does not 
affect yields significantly.   
Section I of the paper explains the theory of how interest rate volatility may 
affect spreads and also presents our hypotheses. The next section describes the data 
used and our control variable selection. Section III presents the main empirical 
results. Finally, section IV concludes and summarizes the research.  
 
II. Interest Rate Volatility and Credit Spreads: Theory and Hypotheses    
A. Effect of Interest Rate Volatility on Yield Spreads for Noncallable Bonds  
Academic research typically classifies models of credit spreads as reduced 
form versus structural form.  In reduced form models there is no process for valuing 
the assets of the firm as dependent upon the level or volatility of interest rates. 
Instead, the analyst develops and examines exogenous stochastic processes for 
probability of default and the recovery rate (in the event of default). The time to 
default is central to these models and is dependent upon exogenous variables, not 
firm specific variables. Default is a surprise in reduced form models. Reduced form 
econometric estimations of swap spreads and corporate bonds yields have been 
performed by, among others, Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Duffee (1999), and Liu, 
Longstaff and Mandell (2006).    
In structural models, default is frequently triggered by asset value falling 
below the firm’s liabilities. Some structural models are one factor models while 
others include two or more (multiple) factors. The first structural model was the one 
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factor model of Merton (1974) where the single factor is a stochastic process for 
value of the firm. Leland and Toft (1996) also developed a one factor model.  More 
recent models tend to have more than one factor where the second factor is 
commonly a stochastic process for the short rate. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) 
developed an early two factor model where the short rate was given as the Vasicek 
(1977) process for the short rate.  Colin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) develop a 
multi-factor structural model where leverage is one of the factors. It is obvious that 
two factor structural models where the factors (processes) are 1.) the risk free short 
rate and 2.) the value of firm assets have strong intuitive appeal because corporate 
debt yields are often considered to have a risk free component and a risk premium 
related to default risk. 
When the short risk free rate is a factor in a structural model, it is important 
to note that volatility of the short rate can be described as a constant, as in Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995).  Alternatively, volatility of the short rate may not be constant 
but a function of the level of short rates and time as in Acharya and Carpenter (2002) 
where the short rate is the well known Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) interest rate 
process. More specifically, interest rate volatility is not constant but potentially a 
function of the level of interest rates where higher rates tend to be associated with 
greater volatility.  See Brenner, Harjes and Kroner (1996) who, among others, find 
that interest volatility depends upon the level of interest rates. 
Some structural models maintain that strategic default is the appropriate 
perspective.  That is, instead of a default being solely triggered by the condition of 
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assets being less than liabilities, the firm constantly assesses the option to default.  In 
other words, default is viewed more as an endogenous voluntary decision where the 
firm follows optimization rules. For our analysis, we utilize the multifactor 
endogenous model of Acharya and Carpenter (2002) as given below. It is appealing 
for our purposes because it suggests theory of how interest rate volatility can affect 
yield spreads.   
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Here Vt is firm value, rt is the short term interest rate, γt  is the firm’s payout rate, 
σ v,t reflects volatility of firm value, tW
~ and is a Brownian motion.  In the interest 
rate process, µ(rt
 
,t) is the drift , σ (rt
 
,t)  is the volatility of the short rate, and tZ~  is a 
second Brownian motion.
 
tρ is the instantaneous correlation between the short-term 
interest rate and firm value processes. It seems intuitive that if the drift for value of 
the firm is dependent upon rt, then spreads likely depend on the level of and 
volatility of the short rate. 
By considering a firm with a single bond outstanding, Acharya and Carpenter 
(2002) model a pure defaultable bond where the option to default is treated as a 
particular kind of a call option on its host bond.  The host bond is a coupon paying 
bond with no default risk. The host bond has price Pt  at time t. At each time t, the 
firm decides whether to service the debt or not (by defaulting). The pure defaultable 
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bond is a host bond less a call option to default where the strike price is Vt,. 45  This is 
because the firm owners are long in the assets, short on the host bond, and long on 
the option to default. 
How is the yield spread related to interest rate volatility ( σ r) for pure 
defaultable bonds? Does σ r increase or decrease the spread? 46  Acharya and 
Carpenter (2002) theoretically analyze the effect of σ r on yield spreads on pure 
defaultable bonds. They view the yield spread of a pure defaultable bond over its 
host bond as a transformation of the default option value. 47  They begin with the idea 
that option value should increase with variance in Pt-Vt, where the time subscript is 
omitted for brevity.  One can decompose the variance of Pt-Vt into the below parts.    
                    
 )V,(P Cov 2-)(VVar +)(PVar  = ) V-P (Var tttttt                          (14) 
Then, one can analyze how interest rate volatility affects each term on the right side.  
While Acharya and Carpenter (2002) analyze the impact of σ r on yield 
spreads by focusing on Cov (Pt,Vt), We focus on Var (Pt) and Var (Vt). Because Eom, 
Helwege, and Huang (2004) find that the covariance between the V and r processes 
is small and insignificant, we do not analyze its impact on the spread.48 It is obvious 
that greater σ r increases the variance of the default free host bond price, Pt, the first 
term of equation (4). The impact of interest rate volatility upon the second term, 
variance of Vt, is not as obvious but would appear to tend positive because the 
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 This call option is not the option to refund high coupon debt with lower coupon debt. We deal with 
this type of call option later. 
46
 Acharya and Carpenter (2002) analyze the impact of interest rate volatility by using the correlation 
between  r and V.  We suggest that the above process is an alternative that lends more insight.  
47
 This is equation (15) in Acharya and Carpenter (2002). 
48
 Of course, Pt is determined by rt  
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variance of V is the weighted average of the volatility of the firm’s debt and the 
firm’s equity.  Note that Campbell and Taksler’s (2003) focus is upon the volatility 
of equity but they also note the importance of volatility in the firm’s debt in 
determining variance of V.  
As in Campbell and Taksler (2003), the volatility of V is expressed as 
follows: 
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where vσ  is the volatility of the firm, dσ  is the volatility of the firm’s debt, eσ is 
the volatility of the firm’s equity, D is the market value of the firm’s debt, and E is 
the market value of the firm’s equity. Since the volatility of the firm is an increasing 
function of the volatility of the firm’s debt, interest rate volatility is expected to have 
a positive effect on the volatility of the firm. In sum, we expect yield spreads to 
increase as σ r rises because interest rate volatility increases both the host bond price 
volatility and firm volatility. This leads to the first hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 1: Interest rate volatility increases yield spreads.  
Our next hypothesis is motivated by the result of Duffee (1998) where he 
finds that bonds with weaker credit quality show a more negative relationship 
between yield spreads and levels of  interest rates than bonds with stronger credit 
quality. As a consequence, the prices of junk bonds are expected to be more 
responsive to interest rate volatility than those of investment grade bonds. Therefore, 
the effect of hypothesis 1 is expected to be greater for junk bonds than for investment 
grade bonds. This leads to our second hypothesis.  
71 
 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between interest rate volatility and yield spreads is 
more strongly positive for junk bonds than for investment grade bonds.  
B. Differential Effect of Interest Rate Volatility on Yield Spreads: Noncallable versus 
Callable Bonds  
The next question is whether the expected positive effect of σ r on yield 
spreads is stronger or weaker for callable bonds. Chance (1990) views a noncallable 
corporate bond as a portfolio of a riskless bond and a short position in a put option 
written on the firm’s assets. On the other hand, Kihn (1994) and Jacoby and Shiller 
(2010) view a callable corporate bond (where callability here means the ability to 
refund at a call price) as a portfolio of the above noncallable corporate bond and a 
short position in a refunding call option written on the bond. Therefore, yield spreads 
of callable corporate bonds consist of both default spreads and call spreads. If 
interest rate volatility increases default risk, as suggested by Hypothesis 1, the 
impact of σ r on call spreads should be affected by the interaction between the call 
provision and default risk. An important question is whether default risk increases or 
decreases the call option value. 
Kim, Ramaswamy, and Sundaresan (1993) find that a call option value in a 
government bond is more valuable than that in a corporate bond, suggesting that 
there should be a negative relation between default risk and a call option value. To 
address this issue, Acharya and Carpenter (2002) built their theory of corporate bond 
valuation upon three types of coupon paying bonds: a.) pure defaultable, b.) pure 
callable, and c.) both defaultable and callable. As previously mentioned, they treat 
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the option to default for the pure defaultable bond as a kind of a call option on its 
host bond. While the strike price of the pure defaultable bond is firm value (Vt), the 
strike price of the pure callable bond is a call price (kt). Since the issuer of a 
defaultable and callable corporate bond has the option to both default and call, the 
firm may stop servicing the debt by either a.) exercising the call  (paying kt  to 
replace the bond with lower coupon debt), or  b.) giving up the firm where the value 
is Vt.   Importantly, the strike price is the minimum of kt  and Vt..49  
By noting that the presence of one option destroys the other option, they 
suggest that there should be a negative relation between default risk and a call option 
value. Jacoby and Shiller (2010) find empirical evidence to support this negative 
relation. Thus, if σ r increases default risk but the increase in default risk weakens 
the call option value, the positive effect of interest rate volatility on yield spreads 
will be weaker for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds.  This leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3A: The hypothesized positive relation between interest rate volatility 
and yield spreads is weaker for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds.  
In contrast to hypothesis 3A, interest rate volatility may increase call option 
values because greater σ r increases the volatility of the underlying instrument and 
thus increases the likelihood that the bond price reaches the call price, kt. King 
(2002) finds that σ r has a positive effect on call option values. Since greater call 
values increase call spreads for callable bonds, σ r may increase call spreads for 
                                                          
49
 Here the endogenous model assumes no minimum net worth or cash flow covenants which force 
the issuer to default. 
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callable bonds. If so, the expected positive impact of interest rate volatility on yield 
spreads will be stronger for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds. Thus, we 
suggest the alternative hypothesis below. 
Hypothesis 3B: The hypothesized positive relation between interest rate volatility 
and yield spreads is stronger for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds.  
C. Differential Effect of Credit Ratings and Equity Volatility on Yield Spreads: 
Noncallable versus Callable Bonds  
The credit rating is the most common proxy for default risk. A bond with 
weaker credit quality should have a greater credit yield spread. However, it is not 
clear whether the effect of the credit rating on yield spreads is stronger or weaker for 
callable bonds than for noncallable bonds. A greater default risk associated with 
weaker credit quality destroys the exercise of the call option and thus reduces the call 
option value, as suggested by Acharya and Carpenter (2002). On the other hand, 
King (2002) empirically finds that a bond with weaker credit quality is associated 
with a higher call option value.  She explains this by suggesting the bond with 
weaker credit quality is more sensitive to the level of interest rates, thereby leading 
to a higher price volatility and a higher probability that the bond price reaches the 
call price. The result of King (2002) is consistent with the finding of Duffee (1998) 
that bonds with weaker credit quality show a more negative relationship between 
yield spreads and level of interest rates. This leads to the following alternative 
hypotheses. 
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Hypothesis 4A: The positive relation between credit ratings and yield spreads is 
weaker for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds.    
Hypothesis 4B: The positive relation between credit ratings and yield spreads is 
stronger for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds.  
Campbell and Taksler (2003) find that a firm’s equity volatility ( σ e) is 
positively related with the yield spread on its debt in the cross-section. King (2002) 
analyzes the determinants of call option values, but she does not take into account 
the impact of σ e on call option values. One interesting question is whether σ e 
increases or decreases the call option value. As mentioned above, Acharya and 
Carpenter (2002) suggest that default risk destroys call option value. If σ e increases 
the default risk and the increase in the default risk reduces the call option value, the 
expected positive relation between a firm’s equity volatility and the yield spread on 
its debt should be weaker for callable bonds. 
Hypothesis 5: The positive relation between a firm’s equity volatility and the yield 
spread on its debt is weaker for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds.    
 
III. Data and Summary Statistics 
A. Data 
We use transaction data from Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine 
(TRACE). Following Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007), we eliminate cancelled, 
corrected, and repeated interdealer trades. According to Chen, Fabozzi, and 
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Sverdlove (2010), there seem to be some errors in the TRACE yield computations.50  
Therefore, we calculated the yield-to-maturity and used these calculated yields to 
maturity instead of the yields to maturity provided by TRACE. In order to compute 
yields, we use the volume-weighted average of all transaction prices during the last 
trading day of the month in which the bond traded as the end-of-month bond price 
rather than the last transaction price of the day. Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and 
Xu (2009) find that a volume-weighted approach leads to better specified and more 
powerful statistical tests than an equal-weighted approach. We eliminate 
observations where the last transaction does not fall between five business days 
before the last trading day and the last trading day of the month.  
We obtain the Treasury constant maturity yields from H.15 release of the 
Federal Reserve System and measure yield spreads as the difference between the 
daily yield on the corporate bond and the constant maturity Treasury yield with the 
same time to maturity. To estimate the entire yield curve, we use a linear 
interpolation scheme from 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, and 30-year Treasury constant 
maturity rates. Interest rate volatility is measured by the standard deviation of the 
daily one-month Treasury constant maturity rate for the 12 months prior to the bond 
transaction date. 
Bond characteristics are obtained from the Fixed Income Securities Database 
(FISD) and the issuer’s accounting information is obtained from the Compustat 
database. We exclude bonds unrated by S&P, as Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) do. 
The credit rating is assigned a cardinalized S&P rating, where AAA=1, . . . , D=22. 
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 They report that some of these apparent errors include entering the time of day in the yield field. 
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As in Guntay and Hackbarth (2010), we exclude bonds with special features such as 
putability, convertibility, and sinking fund provisions. Bonds with make-whole 
provisions are also eliminated. Furthermore, as in Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann 
(2001), we exclude floating-rate bonds and bonds with an odd frequency of coupon 
payments. Following Duffee (1999) and Eom, Helwege, and Huang (2004), we 
eliminate bonds whose maturity is less than one year because they are less likely to 
trade. Finally, we obtain equity prices from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). Equity volatility is calculated as the standard deviation of daily 
excess returns over the CRSP value-weighted index using 252 daily returns prior to 
the bond transaction date.  
Following Campbell and Taksler (2003), we exclude the top and bottom 1% 
of yield spreads from our analysis. The imposition of all the screens above results in 
a sample of 134,167 different bond-month transactions for noncallable bonds and 
88,273 different bond-month transactions for callable bonds.  
B. Control Variables 
The existing literature has included a large number of variables that affect 
yield spreads for noncallable bonds. Thus, we employ a set of control variables that 
has been proven to affect noncallable yield spreads. Given that call values should 
affect call spreads for callable bonds, we also include the determinants of call values 
expected to influence yield spreads for callable bonds. We use interaction terms 
between some of these variables and a callable dummy variable.  
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The short-term interest rate is defined as the one-month Treasury constant 
maturity rate. According to, among others, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and 
Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), an increase in the short-term interest rate 
leads to an increase in the drift of firm value under the risk-neutral measure. Such an 
increase in the drift of firm value decreases the probability of default, thereby 
decreasing any default spread. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Duffee (1998) 
empirically find that there is a negative relation between the level of interest rates 
and yield spreads. Therefore, we expect the short-term interest rate has a negative 
impact on yield spreads.  
Furthermore, call spreads should be positively related to the short-term 
interest rate. The price of a bond declines as the level of the short-term interest rate 
rises due to default risk. Since a call option value is based on the price of the 
underlying asset, an increase in the level of the short-term interest rate should 
decrease the call value and call spread. Consistent with this claim, Duffee (1998) 
finds that the negative relation between interest rates and yield spreads is stronger for 
callable bonds than for noncallable bonds. Therefore, we expect any negative 
relation between short, risk free interest rates and yield spreads to be stronger for 
callable bonds. In addition, as mentioned above, Duffee (1998) finds that the 
negative relation between short-term interest rates and yield spreads is stronger for 
lower rated bonds because the prices of lower rated bonds associated with higher 
default risk are more sensitive to the level of interest rates. The negative relation 
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between short, risk free interest rates and yield spreads is thus expected to be 
stronger for lower rated bonds. 
The slope of the yield curve is measured by the difference between the 10-
year and 1-year Treasury constant maturity rates. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), 
Estrella and Mishkin (1996), Ederington and Stock (2002), and Breeden (2011) 
suggest that the slope of the yield curve reflects the market’s expectation about the 
future strength of the economy. Simply put, a strongly positive yield curve suggests 
the economy will strongly grow while a flat or negative yield curve suggests the 
economy will grow slowly and even experience negative growth. Of course, a 
stronger (weaker) outlook for the economy suggests fewer (greater) defaults and less 
(greater) credit spreads. Thus, the slope of the yield curve is expected to have a 
negative impact on yield spreads.   
 The slope of the yield curve could also affect call spreads. As in Stanhouse 
and Stock (1999), the slope of the term structure may reflect the market’s 
expectation of future interest rates. A greater slope of the term structure reflects the 
market’s expectation of rising interest rates in the future. If the market expects 
interest rates to rise, call option values are expected to decline. King (2002) finds 
that call option values are negatively related to the slope of the yield curve. Thus, the 
negative relation between the slope of the yield curve and total yield spreads is 
expected be stronger for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds.     
A number of recent studies find that liquidity plays an important role in 
determining yield spreads (Chen, Lesmond, Wei (2007), Guntay and Hackbarth 
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(2010), Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), and Rossi (2009)). Even though their liquidity 
measures vary, they all find that liquidity is priced in corporate yield spreads. Guntay 
and Hackbarth (2010) use the number of months a bond traded for the 12 months 
prior to the bond transaction date divided by 12 as their measure of liquidity. In this 
measure, a bond may trade only once a month and appear to be as liquid as one that 
trades every day of a given month. Our measure of liquidity is obtained by dividing 
the number of days a bond traded for the 12 months prior to the bond transaction 
date by the number of business days during the corresponding period. A negative 
coefficient is expected for this variable.        
We also include remaining time to maturity and coupon rate. The effect of 
remaining maturity on yield spreads depends on whether the slope of the corporate 
yield curve is steeper or flatter than that of the government yield curve. If the slope 
of the corporate yield curve is steeper than that of the government risk free yield 
curve, the coefficient on maturity will have a positive sign. On the other hand, King 
(2002) finds that remaining maturity is positively related to call option values in the 
callable period.  
Following Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) and Longstaff, Mithal, 
and Neis (2005), we include coupon rates (in percent) to control for tax effects. 
While interest payments on Treasury bonds are exempt from state taxes, interest 
payments on corporate bonds are subject to state taxes. Corporate bonds with higher 
coupons are taxed more than corporate bonds with lower coupons, so investors 
should demand a higher rate of return to be compensated for holding bonds with 
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higher coupons.51 Therefore, we expect a positive relation between coupon rates and 
yield spreads. In addition, according to King and Mauer (2000), firms tend to call 
higher coupon bonds first. A higher option value associated with a higher coupon 
rate is expected to lead to a greater call spread. Thus, the expected positive relation 
between coupon rates and yield spreads should be greater for callable bonds than for 
noncallable bonds.  
Finally, we include accounting information because it is unclear to investors 
how credit rating agencies use public information to set credit ratings. Following 
Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998), Campbell and Taksler (2003), and Chen, 
Lesmond, and Wei (2007), we include long-term debt to assets and operating income 
to sales. The ratio of long-term debt to assets is measured by dividing long-term debt 
by total assets and the ratio of operating income to sales is measured by dividing 
operating income before depreciation by net sales. Each variable is obtained in the 
year prior to the yield spread measurement.52 Since financially risky firms are likely 
associated with a high level of long-term debt to assets and a low level of operating 
income to sales, we expect a positive sign on the long-term debt to assets and a 
negative sign on the operating income to sales.  
C. Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for the mean and median yield spreads are reported in 
Table XVI. We report results by industry, year, rating, and maturity for noncallable 
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 Tax rates on capital gains are lower than those on coupons for many investors. Also, capital gains 
taxes can be deferred.  
52
 Following Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998) and Campbell and Taksler (2003), we use the 
calendar year assigned by COMPUSTAT for comparability of data.   
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bonds and callable bonds, respectively. Not surprisingly, Panel B of Table XVI 
shows that the mean and median yield spreads were greater during the financial crisis 
of 2008 (2008 and 2009 data), reflecting the increase in credit spreads caused by the 
financial crisis.  
**** Insert Table XVI here **** 
Table XVII provides summary statistics on the variables we use in our 
analysis. The mean and median yield spreads of callable bonds are higher than those 
of noncallable bonds. Many studies have found no significant relation between the 
call provisions and yield spreads. For example, Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) include 
callable bonds in their regressions of yield spreads, but find either negative or 
insignificant call spreads. On the other hand, King (2002) reports that the average 
call option value is 2.25% of par. Our results suggest that call spreads exist. In 
addition, callable bonds are associated with longer maturity, which is consistent with 
Chen, Mao, and Wang (2010). We also find that callable bonds are associated with 
weaker credit quality and lower liquidity, which should lead to higher yield spreads 
for callable bonds.53  
**** Insert Table XVII here **** 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
A.  Effect of Interest Rate Volatility on Yield Spreads for Noncallable Bonds  
We first examine time-series variations of our measure of interest rate 
volatility and yield spreads of noncallable bonds. We plot interest rate volatility and 
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 Crabbe and Helwege (1994) found that lower rated bonds are more likely to have a call feature. 
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the mean yield spread of each month from 2003 to 2009. A positive time-series 
relation between interest rate volatility and the yield spreads of noncallable bonds is 
illustrated in Figure IV.  
**** Insert Figure IV here **** 
To further explore the effect of interest rate volatility on yield spreads of 
noncallable bonds, we estimate the following regression for only noncallable bonds 
with some variables omitted for various specifications:
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For each bond-month observation, itSpreadYield is defined as the difference between 
the daily yield on the corporate bond and the constant maturity Treasury yield with 
the same time to maturity, (σ r)t is defined as the standard deviation of the one-
month Treasury constant maturity rate for the 12 months prior to the bond 
transaction date, tr is the one-month Treasury constant maturity rate,
 
tSlope  is 
defined as the difference between the 10-year and 1-year Treasury constant maturity 
rates, itRating is defined as a cardinalized S&P  rating, where AAA=1, . . . , D=22, 
(σ e )it is defined as the standard deviation of daily excess returns over the CRSP 
value-weighted index for firm i using 252 daily returns prior to the bond transaction 
date,
 
itLiquidity is defined as the number of trading days for the 12 months prior to 
the bond transaction date, itMaturity  is defined as the remaining maturity in years for 
bond i, iCoupon  is defined as the coupon rate measured in percent, ittoAssetsDebt  
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is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, itSalestoIncome  is defined as 
the ratio of operating income before depreciation to net sales, iIndustrial  is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is an industrial bond, and 
iFinancial  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bond was issued by a 
financial firm such as a bank.    
The regression results for only noncallable bonds are presented in Table 
XVIII. The coefficients on σ r have the hypothesized signs and are significant at the 
1% level in all specifications. The last column of Table XVIII shows that a one 
percent increase in interest rate volatility increases the yield spread by 1.63%. The 
yield spread is positively related to σ r after we control for bond-specific, issuer-
specific, and macroeconomic variables. The positive sign of σ r supports our 
hypothesis that σ r increases yield spreads.     
**** Insert Table XVIII here **** 
The negative coefficients on r and Slope have the expected signs and are 
significant at the 1% level in all specifications. The negative sign of r is consistent 
with the empirical findings of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Duffee (1998). As 
expected, the estimated coefficient on the slope of the yield curve is also 
significantly negative. This result is consistent with the findings that the slope of the 
yield curve reflects the market’s expectation of future interest rates. As in all the 
previous studies, the positive and significant sign of Rating implies that a bond with 
weaker credit quality has a greater yield spread. In addition, the effect of σ e
 
on yield 
spreads is positive and significant at the 1% level, which is consistent with the 
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findings with Campbell and Taksler (2003). The negative sign of Liquidity supports 
the existence of liquidity premium. Finally, the negative sign of Income to Sales 
indicates that firms with high levels of operating income to sales are less likely to 
default, thereby leading to low yield spreads.  
We examine whether our findings are robust to different σ r and σ e 
specifications and a different measure of credit ratings. According to the Black-
Scholes model in deriving implied volatilities, the effects of σ r and σ e on the 
default option value should be proportional to the square root of the time to maturity. 
Thus, we use a different specification by replacing σ r and σ e with 
σ r* 1/2(Maturity) and σ e * 1/2(Maturity) . In addition, we use a different measure of 
credit ratings because the yield spread between AAA and AA+ is likely smaller than 
that between C and D. Furthermore, we reverse the rating scale such that D=1, …, 
AAA=22 and take logs of all rating levels. The results are shown in Table XIX. The 
coefficients on σ r* 1/2(Maturity) and σ e * 1/2(Maturity) are both significantly 
positive and the coefficients on Rating  are significantly negative. 54  Using the 
different specification and the different measure of credit ratings does not change the 
major results reported above.  
**** Insert Table XIX here **** 
In order to investigate whether the positive relation between σ r  and yield 
spreads was caused by the 2008 financial crisis, we run separate regressions for 
different time periods: the pre-crisis period (2003-2007) and the crisis period(2008-
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 We also add these two interaction terms instead of substituting for σ r and σ e. However, the 
coefficients on these two interaction terms are not significantly positive.  
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2009).55 As reported in the first two columns of Table XX, the relation between σ r 
and the yield spreads is significantly positive at the 5% and 1% levels during the pre-
crisis period and crisis period, respectively. We also run separate regressions for 
investment grade bonds and junk bonds. The positive relation between σ r and the 
yield spreads is still significant for both investment grade bonds and junk bonds. We 
also perform fixed effect regressions to investigate whether the positive relation 
between σ r  and the yield spreads is the product of spurious cross-sectional or time-
series correlations. As shown in Table XXI, the coefficients on σ r are positive and 
significant at the 1% level. 
***** Insert Table XX here **** 
**** Insert Table XXI here **** 
Finally, we perform regressions of monthly changes in yield spreads on 
monthly changes in all variables to remove any time-series trends: 
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where ∆  denotes the first difference in each variable and itSpreadYield∆ is the 
change in yield spreads between two consecutive months. Unlike the previous 
regressions, here we eliminate Maturity∆ and the variables that do not change on a 
monthly basis. In addition, our measures of σ r, σ e, and liquidity are different from 
those of the previous regressions. σ r is measured as the standard deviation of the 
daily one-month Treasury constant maturity rate for the one month (not the 12 
months) prior to the bond transaction date. σ e is calculated as the standard deviation 
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 Following Bao et al. (2011), the pre-crisis period excludes 2008 and 2009.  
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of daily excess returns over the CRSP value-weighted index using one month of 
daily returns (not 252 daily returns) prior to the bond transaction date. Liquidity is 
measured by dividing the number of days a bond traded for the one month (not the 
12 months) prior to the bond transaction date by the number of business days during 
the corresponding period. We find a significantly positive relation between monthly 
changes in σ r and monthly changes in yield spreads.56 The last column in Table 
XXII shows that a one percent change in interest rate volatility results in a 0.936% 
change in the yield spread.  
**** Insert Table XXII here **** 
B. Differential Effect of Interest Rate Volatility, Credit Ratings, and Equity 
Volatility on Yield Spreads: Noncallable versus Callable Bonds 
The regression results for callable bonds are presented in Table XXIII. We 
find a positive and significant relation between σ r and the yield spreads. It is 
interesting to note that the coefficients on σ e  are not significant in all specifications, 
supporting the hypothesis that the positive relation between a firm’s equity volatility 
and the yield spread on its debt is weaker for callable bonds. This can be explained 
by Acharya and Carpenter (2002) who suggest that default risk destroys call option 
values. An increase in default risk, driven by an increase in σ e, seems to reduce the 
call spread, thereby offsetting the positive effect of σ e on the default spread.  
**** Insert Table XXIII here **** 
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 The results are similar when we use Newey-West (1987) Standard errors and standard errors that 
are clustered at the firm and year level.  
 
87 
 
We also compare Maturity in this table with those in Table XXI. While the 
coefficients on Maturity for noncallable bonds are insignificant, we find a 
significantly negative relation between Maturity and the yield spreads for callable 
bonds. King (2002) finds that call option values decrease with the remaining time to 
maturity in the call protection period. Given that a callable bond cannot be exercised 
in the call protection period, a call option value should become greater as the callable 
bond approaches the first call date. Therefore, call option values are expected to be 
negatively related to the remaining time to maturity. This effect might explain the 
negative relation between remaining maturity and yield spreads.  
We now explore whether the positive relationship between σ r and yield 
spreads is different for junk bonds and callable bonds. We run regressions for the full 
sample of both noncallable and callable bonds with interaction terms. Junk is used as 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is a junk grade bond, and Call is 
used as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is callable. As shown in 
Table XXIV, the coefficients on Junk* σ r show the expected positive sign, 
supporting our hypothesis that the prices of junk bonds are more sensitive to interest 
rate volatility than those of investment grade bonds.  
**** Insert Table XXIV here **** 
One interesting question is whether the positive effect of interest rate 
volatility on yield spreads is stronger or weaker for callable bonds. As previously 
hypothesized, the two conflicting theories expect different effects of σ r on yield 
spreads on callable bonds relative to noncallable bonds. The negative sign of 
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Call*σ r supports the hypothesis that the positive relation between σ r and yield 
spreads is weaker for callable bonds, because an increase in default risk resulting 
from an increase in σ r reduces a call option value.  
Similarly, the coefficients on Call*σ e are negative and significant in every 
specification, supporting the hypothesis that an increase in default risk resulting from 
an increase in σ e reduces a call option value. On the other hand, the coefficients on 
Call*Rating are significantly positive, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
the positive relation between credit ratings and yield spreads is stronger for callable 
bonds than for noncallable bonds. This is consistent with the findings of King 
(2002), who empirically finds that a bond with weaker credit quality is associated 
with a higher call option value.  
We find a positive and significant relation between Call and the yield 
spreads, suggesting that positive call spreads exist. The estimated coefficients on 
other explanatory interaction variables are also as predicted. The coefficients on 
Junk*r show the expected negative sign, which is consistent with the findings of 
Duffee (1998), who reports that the negative relation between yield spreads and the 
level of interest rates is stronger for lower rated bonds. All the other interaction 
variables with the call option have the expected signs. The negative effect of the 
short-term interest rate on yield spreads is significantly stronger for callable bonds, 
suggesting that call option values are negatively related to the short-term interest 
rate. This is because the value of a call option is positively related to the bond’s 
price. Furthermore, the sign of Call*Slope is as expected. The slope of the yield 
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curve seems to reflect the market’s expectation of future interest rates. The call 
spread becomes smaller as the slope of the yield curve becomes steeper, which 
indicates that interest rates are expected to rise. The positive sign of Call*Coupon 
suggests that call options are worth more when coupon rates are greater because 
firms want to lower the cost of borrowing by calling bonds with higher coupons first.  
Finally, we examine whether the relation between the determinants of call 
values and yield spreads on callable bonds is stronger or weaker for high-priced 
bonds than for low-priced bonds.57 HP is used as a dummy variable that takes the 
value 1 if the bond price is greater than 100.58 Following King (2002), we divide 
callable bonds in the sample into two groups: callable bonds that are in the call 
protection period and callable bonds that are in the callable period. The results are 
shown in Table XXV. We find that the effects of σ r , σ e , and Rating on yield 
spreads on callable bonds are generally weaker for high-priced callable bonds. 
Acharya and Carpenter (2002) suggest that an increase in default risk reduces call 
option values. This effect seems to be stronger for high-priced callable bonds, 
because call option values are more sensitive to the change in default risk when they 
are in-the-money.  
**** Insert Table XXV here **** 
 
V. Conclusions 
                                                          
57
 While a call price is identifiable if it is par, the FISD does not provide clear information of non-par 
call prices until the bond issues are called. Therefore, we eliminate callable bonds whose call prices 
are not par. Fourteen percent of callable bonds are eliminated due to call price being unequal to par.  
58
 Nineteen percent of callable bonds in the sample are high-price bonds.  
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This paper examines the impact of interest rate volatility on yield spreads for 
noncallable bonds. Campbell and Taksler (2003) argue that a firm with a higher level 
of equity volatility is more likely to default. Given that the total firm volatility also 
includes the volatility of a firm’s bonds, interest rate volatility should affect default 
risk. The greater the interest rate volatility, the more volatile the price of a bond. As 
the bond price becomes more volatile, the volatility of the assets’ market value 
increases, thereby leading to an increase in default spread.  We find that interest rate 
volatility is positively related to yield spreads on noncallable bonds.  
We find the relationship between interest rate volatility and yield spreads is 
more strongly positive for junk bonds than for investment grade bonds. Investment 
grade bonds are unlikely to default, pointed out by Campbell and Taksler (2003). As 
a consequence, the positive effect of interest rate volatility on the default spread 
should be more significant for junk bonds. In addition, we find that the average yield 
spread on callable bonds is greater than that on noncallable bonds, indicating that the 
embedded options in callable bonds are priced in yield spreads on callable bonds.   
We also investigate whether the effect of interest rate volatility on yield 
spreads is greater or smaller for callable bonds than for noncallable bonds. The two 
conflicting theories predict different effects of interest rate volatility on yield spreads 
on callable bonds versus noncallable bonds. Acharya and Carpenter (2002) suggest 
that default (call) risk destroys call (default) option values. An increase in default 
risk, driven by an increase in interest rate volatility, should reduce the call spread, 
thereby offsetting the positive effect of interest rate volatility
 
on the default spread.  
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On the other hand, interest rate volatility might increase call spreads by inducing a 
higher price volatility of callable bonds, which is consistent with the finding of King 
(2002) that a bond with weaker credit quality shows a higher call option value. We 
find that the effect of interest rate volatility on yield spreads is smaller for callable 
bonds than for noncallable bonds. Similarly, we find that the positive relation 
between a firm’s equity volatility and the yield spread on its debt is weaker for 
callable bonds.   
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APPENDIX A 
Regressions Adjusting for Clustering for Forced banks 
The dependent variable is the abnormal returns based on the mean-adjusted model. Abnormal returns 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering. TRUST is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
observation is a TP. CALLABLE is a dummy variable equal to one if the observation has a call 
option. MATURITY is measured as the natural log of remaining time to maturity.  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept 
  
0.1248*** 
(3.03) 
0.1335* 
(1.96) 
0.1308 
(1.94) 
TRUST (TP) 0.1319*** 
(3.07) 
0.1463*** 
(2.94) 
0.1329*** 
(2.93) 
CALLABLE  0.0881*** 
(4.59) 
 0.1042 
(1.86) 
MATURITY  0.0179 
(1.17) 
-0.0063 
(-0.23) 
Sample Size 121 121 121 
F, (p-value) 14.78 7.62 25.64 
 (0.0048) (0.0225) (0.0008) 
R-squared 0.2639 0.2447 0.2648 
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APPENDIX B 
Abnormal Returns around the October 14th Announcement for Forced Banks: Market Model 
Abnormal returns over various event windows based on the market model are reported for the equal 
weight approach and the portfolio approach. For the portfolio approach, each portfolio consists of all 
preferred stock belonging to a particular bank. The second t-stats in Panel A are computed using the 
“Crude Dependence Adjustment” of Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). For the second t-stats, the 
standard deviations of abnormal returns are estimated from the average abnormal returns between 
11/1/2007 and 10/6/2008. 
Panel A: The Market Model (Equal Weight)  
[0,0] [-1,0] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] 
ALL (n=121) (pooled) 0.0212 0.0324 0.0359 0.004 
Conventional T-stats (3.73) *** (2.67) *** (3.72) *** (0.41) 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence 
Adjustment” (3.98) *** (4.30) *** (3.01) *** (0.23) 
TRUST (TP) (n=53) 
 0.0349 0.0425 0.0758 0.0463 
Conventional T-stats (4.18) *** (2.36) ** (4.99) *** (2.46) ** 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence 
Adjustment” (4.98) *** (4.29) *** (4.84) *** (1.99)* 
NONTRUST (NTP) (n=68) 0.0101 0.0242 0.0033 -0.0295 
Conventional T-stats (1.33)  (1.46)  (0.30)  (-2.59)*** 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence 
Adjustment” (1.87)* (3.17) *** (0.27) (-1.64)  
T-test for difference in mean 
between two subsamples 2.19** 0.74 3.85 *** 3.45 *** 
Panel B: The Market Model (Portfolio Approach)  
  
[0,0] [-1,0] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] 
ALL (n=13) (pooled) 0.006 0.0134 0.0273 0.0060 
 (0.32)  (0.30)  (0.98)  (0.34)  
TRUST (TP) (n=7) 0.0378 0.0718 0.0733 0.0399 
 (1.65)  (1.60)  (1.75)  (1.62)  
NONTRUST (NTP) (n=6) 
-0.0295 -0.05461 -0.0264 -0.0335 
 (-0.90)  (-0.72)  (-1.25)  (-2.58) ** 
The dependent T-stat for difference in mean between two subsamples is not significant for the 
portfolio approach due to the small sample size even though the sign for the difference between trust 
and non-trust is positive. 
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Table I. The Ranking Order of Claims on Bank 
This table describes the priority of claims on banks. Non-Trust preferred (NTP) and TARP preferred 
have equal priority and both have a lower claim than Trust preferred (TP).  
Priority of Claims Claims on Bank 
1 Insured Deposits 
2 Uninsured Deposits 
3 Senior Debt 
4 Junior Subordinated Debt  
5 Trust Preferred (TP) Stock 
6 Non-trust Preferred (NTP) Stock and TARP Preferred Stock 
7 Common Stock 
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Table II. Matching Pairs of NTP and TP Raw Returns based on September 18 announcement 
Panel A presents matching pairs of each type of preferred stock according to the issuer, maturity, and dividend yield. The 
two matched preferred stocks are required to have the same issuer, similar maturities, and similar dividend yields. For the 
match, we allowed a maximum of one year’s difference for maturity. For a perpetuity, our match required at least 59 years 
maturity. Regarding dividend yield, we allow a maximum of one percent difference. Panel B shows the average raw returns 
of each type of preferred stock and compares returns of TP and NTP. 
Panel A: Matching Pairs of each type of preferred stock 
Firm TP/NTP Maturity (years) Dividend Yield (%)  Raw Returns 
Bank of America NTP 24 8.125 0.221 TP 25 8.1 0.095 
Bank of America NTP 24 6.5 -0.011 TP 25 6.75 -0.019 
Bank of America NTP 25 5.875 0.043 TP 25 5.875 0.081 
Bank of America NTP 25 5.5 0.126 TP 25 6 0.014 
Bank of America NTP 26 6 0.097 TP 26 6 0.075 
Bank of America NTP perpetual 6.7 0.151 TP perpetual 7 0.077 
Bank of America NTP perpetual 7.25 -0.113 TP perpetual 7.28 0.12 
Bank of America NTP perpetual 7.25 0.146 TP perpetual 7.28 0.121 
Citigroup NTP perpetual 8.125 0.18 TP 59 7.25 0.229 
Citigroup NTP perpetual 8.5 0.221 TP 59 7.875 0.105 
Goldman Sachs NTP perpetual float 0.085 TP perpetual float 0.109 
Goldman Sachs NTP perpetual float 0.095 TP perpetual flooat 0.109 
JPMorgan Chase NTP 24 7 0.147 TP 23 7.2 0.04 
JPMorgan Chase NTP perpetual  6.1 0.021 TP 69 6.875 0.033 
Wells Fargo NTP perpetual  7.25 0.31 TP 59 7.85 0.405 
Wells Fargo NTP perpetual  8 0.476 TP 60 7.875 0.036 
Panel B: Average of Raw Returns of Each Type of Preferred Stock 
  NTP TP  Total 
Equal Weight (Individual Issues) 0.137 0.102 0.119 
(number of shares with higher raw 
returns) 9 7 16 
Portfolio Approach (portfolio of all 
issues by same firm) 0.170 0.121 0.145 
(number of banks  with higher raw 
returns) 4 1 5 
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Table III. Average Preferred Stock Yields and Overpayment of the banks                                                                                                                             
OVERPAYMENT is measured by the difference between average preferred stock yields of each bank 
on 10/6/2008, prior to TARP, and the 5 percent yield on the government’s preferred stock purchase. 
Preferred stock yields were obtained from the Bloomberg information system. 
 
Bank of 
America 
Morgan 
Stanley 
Wells 
Fargo 
JPMorgan 
Chase 
Citigroup Goldman 
Sachs 
Bank of 
NY 
Mellon  
Mean 12.09 14.55 10.07 9.22 12.48 8.26 9.38 
OVERPAYMENT 
(Mean less 5%) 7.09 9.55 5.07 4.22 7.48 3.26 4.38 
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Table IV. Description of Preferred Stock Outstanding 
Panel A shows the number of each type of preferred stock in the largest banks. Panel B shows the number of each type of preferred stock of the non-forced banks that announced that they had 
received preliminary approval for TARP issuance.  
Panel A: Type of preferred stock outstanding for the forced banks 
 Trust Non-trust Callable Non-callable Zero-Dividend Fixed-rate  Floating-rate  Total Sample 
Bank of America 20 36 41 15 14 34 8 56 
Citigroup 11 2 13 0 0 13 0 13 
Goldman Sachs 1 3 4 0 0 1 3 4 
JPMorgan Chase 4 9 13 0 0 12 1 13 
Morgan Stanley 6 16 10 12 9 12 1 22 
Bank of NY Mellon  2 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 
Wells Fargo 9 2 11 0 0 11 0 11 
Total Sample 53 68 94 27 23 85 13 121 
Panel B: Type of preferred stock outstanding of the non-forced banks that announced that they had received preliminary approval for the TARP fund 
 Trust Non-trust Callable Non-callable Zero-Dividend Fixed-rate  Floating-rate  Total Sample 
Associated Bancorp 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
BB&T 2 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 
Popular Inc 1 3 4 0 0 4 0 4 
Capital One 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Citizens Republic Bancorp 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
First Bancorp 0 5 5 0 0 5 0 5 
Fifth Third Bancorp 3 0 3 0 0 0 3 3 
Huntington Bancshares Inc 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Independent Banc Corp 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Keycorp 5 0 5 0 0 5 0 5 
M&T Bank Corp 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
National Penn Bancshares Inc  1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Old National Bancorp 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Old Second Bancorp 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
PNC Financial Services Group 5 1 6 0 0 5 1 6 
Regions Financial Corporation 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Sterling Bancshares Inc 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Southern Community Financial Corp  0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
SVB Financial Group 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
SunTrust Banks 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 2 
Sterling Bancorp 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Susquehanna Bancshares Inc 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
Taylor Capital Group Inc  1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
U.S. Bancorp 7 1 8 0 0 7 1 8 
Valley National Bancorp 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Webster Financial Corp 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
Zions Bancorp 1 1 2 0 0 1 1 2 
Total Sample 38 17 55 0 0 47 8 55 
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Table V. Returns around Oct. 14 Announcement for Forced Banks 
Raw returns and the mean-adjusted returns over various event windows are reported for the equal weight approach and the po
rtfolio approach. For the portfolio approach, each portfolio consists of all preferred stock belonging to a particular bank. The 
second t-stats in Panel A and Panel C are computed using the “Crude Dependence Adjustment” of Brown and Warner (1980, 
1985). 
Panel A: The Raw Returns (Equal Weight) 
  
[0,0] [-1,0] [-2,+2] [-5,+5] 
ALL (n=121) (pooled) 0.0911 0.2467 0.1808 0.0743 
Conventional T-stats (13.25) *** (15.68) *** (12.19) *** (5.81) *** 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence 
Adjustment” (4.97)*** (9.53)*** (4.41)*** (1.22) 
TRUST (TP) (n=53) 0.1329 0.3404 0.2832 0.1496 
Conventional T-stats (12.22) *** (13.80) *** (12.89) *** (7.18) *** 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence 
Adjustment” (5.31)*** (9.63)*** (5.06)*** (1.80)* 
NONTRUST (NTP) (n=68) 0.0585 0.1737 0.1010 0.0156 
Conventional T-stats (8.92) *** (11.23) *** (7.29) *** (1.31) 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence 
Adjustment” (4.39)*** (9.23)*** (3.39)*** (0.35) 
T-test for difference in mean 
between two subsamples (5.85) *** (5.72) *** (7.01) *** (5.59) *** 
Panel B: The Raw Returns (Portfolio Approach) 
ALL (n=13) (pooled) 0.0888 0.2638 0.2008 0.0924 
 (3.96) *** (5.51) *** (4.42) *** (3.52) *** 
TRUST (TP) (n=7)  0.1174 0.3140 0.2433 0.1239 
 (3.29) *** (3.76) *** (3.32) *** (3.06) *** 
NONTRUST (NTP) (n=6) 0.0554 0.2053 0.1513 0.0556 
 (2.73) ** (6.79) *** (3.15) *** (1.99) * 
Panel C: The Mean-Adjusted Model (Equal Weight) 
ALL (n=121) (pooled) 0.0931 0.2505 0.1900 0.0940 
Conventional T-stats (13.48) *** (15.86) *** (12.68) *** (7.15) *** 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence 
Adjustment” (5.19)*** (9.88)*** (4.74)*** (1.58) 
TRUST (TP) (n=53) 0.1347 0.3440 0.2922 0.1694 
Conventional T-stats (12.30) *** (13.86) *** (13.04) *** (7.74) *** 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence 
Adjustment” (5.52)*** (9.98)*** (5.35)*** (2.09)** 
NONTRUST (NTP) (n=68) 0.0606 0.1776 0.1104 0.0352 
Conventional T-stats (9.21) *** (11.45) *** (7.89) *** (2.95) *** 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence 
Adjustment” (4.62)*** (9.58)*** (3.76)*** (0.81) 
T-test for difference in mean 
between two subsamples 5.80 *** 5.68 *** 6.88 *** 5.38 *** 
Panel D: The Mean-Adjusted Model (Portfolio Approach) 
ALL (n=13) (pooled) 0.0908 0.2674 0.2095 0.1112 
 (4.04) *** (5.54) *** (4.53) *** (3.96) *** 
TRUST (TP) (n=7) 0.1192 0.3168 0.2504 0.1394 
 (3.32) *** (3.76) *** (3.33) *** (3.12) *** 
NONTRUST (NTP) (n=6) 0.0576 0.2097 0.1619 0.0782 
 (2.81) ** (6.80) *** (3.31) *** (2.62) ** 
The dependent T-stat for difference in mean between two subsamples is not significant for the portfolio approach due to the s
mall sample size even though the sign for the difference between trust and non-trust is positive. 
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Table VI. Estimated Parameters for Returns of the Forced Banks  
The dependent variable is the raw returns and the mean-adjusted returns over the announcement 
window. WELLS FARGO is used as a benchmark. BANK OF AMERICA is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if the observation belongs to BANK OF AMERICA. CITIGROUP is a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the observation belongs to CITIGROUP. BANK of NY MELLON is 
a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation belongs to Bank of NY Mellon. 
JPMORGAN CHASE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation belongs to 
JPMORGAN CHASE. MORGAN STANLEY is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the 
observation belongs to MORGAN STANLEY. GOLDMAN SACHS is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if the observation belongs to GOLDMAN SACHS. TRUST is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the observation is a trust preferred stock. TRUST is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
observation is a trust preferred stock. CALLABLE is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
observation has a call option. MATURITY is measured as the natural log of remaining time to 
maturity.  
Panel A: The Raw Returns Based on [-1,0] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.1149*** 
(-3.09) 
-0.1493*** 
(-4.00) 
-0.1533*** 
(-4.14) 
BANK OF AMERICA 0.1249*** 
(4.91) 
0.1324*** 
(5.51) 
0.1316*** 
(5.61) 
CITIGROUP 0.2354*** 
(10.75) 
0.2370*** 
(11.67) 
0.2365*** 
(12.06) 
BANK OF NY MELLON 0.1246*** 
(5.70) 
0.1622*** 
(6.64) 
0.1444*** 
(6.30) 
JPMORGAN CHASE 0.0501 
(1.46) 
0.0703** 
(1.98) 
0.0539 
(1.64) 
MORGAN STANLEY 0.3724*** 
(8.03) 
0.3889*** 
(8.38) 
0.3912*** 
(8.88) 
GOLDMAN SACHS 0.0221 
(0.44) 
0.0035 
(0.07) 
0.0069 
(0.14) 
TRUST (TP) 0.1087*** 
(4.65) 
0.1228*** 
(5.78) 
0.1041*** 
(4.79) 
CALLABLE  0.1996*** 
(6.13) 
 0.1367** 
(2.64) 
MATURITY  0.03586*** 
(7.25) 
0.0276** 
(2.03) 
Sample Size 121 121 121 
F, (p-value) 43.37 53.13 45.86 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.6673  0.6474  0.6812 
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Table VI-Continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: The Mean-Adjusted Model Based on [-1,0] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.1123*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.1476*** 
(-3.95) 
-0.1516*** 
(-4.09) 
BANK OF AMERICA 0.1267*** 
(4.99) 
0.1344*** 
(5.61) 
0.1337*** 
(5.71) 
CITIGROUP 0.2390*** 
(10.83) 
0.2406*** 
(11.79) 
0.2401*** 
(12.18) 
BANK OF NY MELLON 0.1238*** 
(5.25) 
0.1616*** 
(6.11) 
0.1440*** 
(5.80) 
JPMORGAN CHASE 0.0484 
(1.41) 
0.0685* 
(1.93) 
0.0523 
(1.59) 
MORGAN STANLEY 0.3750*** 
(8.03) 
0.3920*** 
(8.42) 
0.3942*** 
(8.91) 
GOLDMAN SACHS 0.0255 
(0.51) 
0.065 
(0.13) 
0.0099 
(0.21) 
TRUST (TP) 0.1089*** 
(4.65) 
0.1227*** 
(5.79) 
0.1042*** 
(4.80) 
CALLABLE  0.1995*** 
(6.09) 
 0.1352** 
(2.59) 
MATURITY  0.0589*** 
(7.30) 
0.0283** 
(2.07) 
Sample Size 121 121 121 
F, (p-value) 42.89 52.81 45.79 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.6677  0.6494  0.6821 
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Table VII. Estimated Parameters for Returns of the Forced Banks Using Firm Specific 
Characteristics 
The dependent variable is the raw returns and the mean-adjusted returns over the announcement 
window. OVERPAYMENT is measured by the difference between average yields of each bank 
immediately prior to TARP and the 5 percent yield on the government’s preferred stock. TRUST is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the observation is a trust preferred stock. CALLABLE is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the observation has a call option. MATURITY is measured as the natural log 
of remaining time to maturity.  
Panel A: The Raw Returns  Based on [-1,0] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.3824*** 
(-5.81) 
-0.3991*** 
(-5.70) 
-0.4238*** 
(-6.27) 
OVERPAYMENT 0.0613*** 
(7.46) 
0.0614*** 
(7.06) 
0.0638*** 
(7.77) 
TRUST (TP) 0.1083*** 
(4.57) 
0.1244*** 
(5.60) 
0.1041*** 
(4.51) 
CALLABLE  0.2022*** 
(6.62) 
 0.1506*** 
(2.83) 
MATURITY  0.0559*** 
(6.72) 
0.0222 
(1.46) 
Sample Size 121 121 121 
F, (p-value) 40.85 38.19 33.31 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.5787  0.5464  0.5881 
Panel B: The Mean-Adjusted Model Based on [-1,0] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.3826*** 
(-5.78) 
-0.4012*** 
(-5.73) 
-0.4256*** 
(-6.29) 
OVERPAYMENT 0.0620*** 
(7.50) 
0.0621*** 
(7.15) 
0.0645*** 
(7.84) 
TRUST (TP) 0.1087*** 
(4.58) 
0.1244*** 
(5.59) 
0.1044*** 
(4.52) 
CALLABLE  0.2023*** 
(6.59) 
 0.1486*** 
(2.78) 
MATURITY  0.0563*** 
(6.79) 
0.0231 
(1.52) 
Sample Size 121 121 121 
F, (p-value) 40.77 38.68 33.47 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
R-squared 0.5797  0.5495 0.5898 
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Table VIII. Returns of Non-forced Banks for Different Windows 
The raw returns and the mean-adjusted returns on the October 14th TARP announcement and the later announcement of bank 
specific approval for TARP capital are reported for the equal weight approach and the portfolio approach. For the portfolio 
approach, each portfolio consists of all preferred stock belonging to a particular bank. The second t-stats in Panel A and Panel 
C are computed using the “Crude Dependence Adjustment” of Brown and Warner (1980,1985). 
Panel A: The Raw Returns (Equal Weight) 
  Oct. 14 [-1,0]  Approval 
ALL (pooled) 0.2384 0.0398 
Conventional T-stats (8.96) *** (3.30) *** 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence Adjustment” (8.02) *** (1.89)* 
 (n=54) (n=50) 
TRUST (TP) 0.3049 0.0399 
Conventional T-stats (10.27) *** (3.18) *** 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence Adjustment” (8.29) *** (1.53) 
 (n=38) (n=36) 
NONTRUST (NTP) 0.0805 0.0398 
Conventional T-stats (2.64) ** (1.32)  
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence Adjustment” (4.37) *** (3.06) *** 
 (n=16) (n=14) 
T-test for difference in mean 
between two subsamples 5.27 *** 0.00 
Panel B: The Raw Returns (Portfolio Approach) 
  Oct. 14 [-1,0]  Approval 
ALL (pooled) 0.2143 0.0390 
 (8.08) *** (2.53) ** 
 (n=30) (n=29) 
TRUST (TP) 0.2581 0.0342 
 (8.29) *** (2.25) ** 
 (n=20) (n=19) 
NONTRUST (NTP) 0.1266 0.0482 
 (3.19) *** (1.38)  
 (n=10) (n=10) 
T-test for difference in mean 
between two subsamples 2.47** -0.35 
Panel C: The Mean-Adjusted Model (Equal Weight) 
  Oct. 14 [-1,0]  Approval 
ALL (pooled) 0.2428 0.0414 
Conventional T-stats (9.00) *** (3.41) *** 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence Adjustment” (8.21) *** (1.98)* 
 (n=54) (n=50) 
TRUST (TP) 0.3098 0.0424 
Conventional T-stats (10.28) *** (3.33) *** 
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence Adjustment” (8.49) *** (1.64) 
 (n=38) (n=36) 
NONTRUST (NTP) 0.0838 0.0388 
Conventional T-stats (2.70) *** (1.32)  
T-stats Using “Crude Dependence Adjustment” (4.56) *** (2.98) *** 
 (n=16) (n=14) 
T-test for difference in mean 
between two subsamples 5.22 *** 0.11 
Panel D: The Mean-Adjusted Model (Portfolio Approach) 
  Oct. 14 [-1,0]  Approval 
ALL (pooled) 0.2143 0.0390 
 (8.08) *** (2.53) ** 
 (n=30) (n=29) 
TRUST (TP) 0.2581 0.0342 
 (8.29) *** (2.25) ** 
 (n=20) (n=19) 
NONTRUST (NTP) 0.1266 0.0482 
 (3.19) *** (1.38)  
 (n=10) (n=10) 
T-test for difference in mean 
between two subsamples 2.44** -0.33 
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Table IX. Estimated Parameters for Returns of the Non- Forced Banks 
The dependent variable is the raw returns and the mean-adjusted returns on (1) the October 14th 
announcement, (2) the later announcement of preliminary approval for the TARP fund. 
OVERPAYMENT is measured by the difference between average yields of each bank immediately 
prior to TARP and the 5 percent yield on the government’s preferred stock. TRUST is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the observation is a trust preferred stock. MATURITY is measured as the 
natural log of remaining time to maturity. All preferred stocks are callable stocks.   
Panel A: The Raw Returns  
  (1) Oct. 14 [-1,0]  (2) Approval 
Intercept 
  
-0.1420 
(-0.93) 
0.0096 
(0.11) 
OVERPAYMENT 
  
0.0237*** 
(5.35) 
0.0109*** 
(3.63) 
TRUST (TP) 
  
0.1521*** 
(5.79) 
-0.0415 
(-1.28) 
MATURITY 0.0210 
(0.54) 
-0.0087 
(-0.43) 
Sample Size 54 50 
F, (p-value) 27.45 4.78 
(0.0000) (0.0056) 
R-squared 0.6529 0.4226 
Panel B: The Mean-Adjusted Model  
  (1) Oct. 14 [-1,0]  (2) Approval 
Intercept 
  
-0.1462 
(-0.95) 
-0.0136 
(-0.17) 
OVERPAYMENT 
  
0.0242*** 
(5.41) 
0.0111*** 
(3.68) 
TRUST (TP) 
  
0.1522*** 
(5.76) 
-0.0359 
(-1.20) 
MATURITY 0.0221 
(0.56) 
-0.0037 
(-0.19) 
Sample Size 54 50 
F, (p-value) 27.57 4.97 
(0.0000) (0.0045) 
R-squared 0.6571 0.4287 
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Table X. Stylized Marginal Rates of Substitution between Dividends and Capital Gains for the 
Various Holding Groups before and after the 2003 Tax Cut 
This table is constructed based on maximum tax rates and ignoring benefits of delaying capital gain 
taxes.  
 Before the 2003 tax cut After the 2003 tax cut 
Individual investors 77.02.01
386.01
1
1
=
−
−
=
−
−
g
d
t
t
 
00.1
15.01
15.01
1
1
=
−
−
=
−
−
g
d
t
t
 
Non-corporate 
institutional investors 
00.1
00.01
00.01
1
1
=
−
−
=
−
−
g
d
t
t
 
00.1
00.01
00.01
1
1
=
−
−
=
−
−
g
d
t
t
 
Corporate investors 37.135.01
105.01
1
1
=
−
−
=
−
−
g
d
t
t
 
37.1
35.01
105.01
1
1
=
−
−
=
−
−
g
d
t
t
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Table XI. The Ex-Day Premium Grouped by the Level of Individual Ownership 
This table shows the mean ex-day premium within each decile of individual ownership. Individual 
ownership is defined as the number of shares held by individual investors divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding.   
Decile Individual Ownership N Mean S.D. 
1 0.0310 3284 0.7018 4.1415 
2 0.1784 3283 0.7620 4.0278 
3 0.2615 3283 0.6937 3.8041 
4 0.3426 3283 0.7096 3.4921 
5 0.4239 3283 0.7286 3.4213 
6 0.5228 3283 0.7418 3.1888 
7 0.6367 3283 0.6709 3.2657 
8 0.7532 3283 0.5985 3.2574 
9 0.8560 3283 0.5125 3.2634 
10 0.9526 3283 0.4740 3.2706 
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Table XII. Summary Statistics 
PREM is the ex-day premium. YIELD is measured as the amount of the dividend divided by the 
cum-day price. IND is defined as the number of shares held by individual investors divided by the 
total number of shares outstanding. HETERO is defined as the product of the number of shares held 
by individual investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding and the number of shares 
held by institutional investors divided by the total number of share outstanding. EXVOL is defined as 
the difference between the average daily turnover (the ratio of shares traded to shares outstanding) 
during the 11-day event period [-5,5] and the average daily turnover during the 80-day estimation 
period [-45,-6] and [6,45], divided by the average daily turnover during the 80-day estimation 
period. TC
 
(Transaction Cost) is measured by dividing one by the cum-day price. RISK is calculated 
by dividing the variance of a stock’s variance by the variance of the market returns during the 
estimation period [-45,-6] and [6,45]. 
Variable N Mean Median S.D. 
PREM 32831 0.6594 0.7058 3.5298 
YIELD 32831 0.0060 0.0052 0.0042 
IND 32831 0.4959 0.4680 0.2914 
HETERO 32831 0.1650 0.1899 0.1250 
EXVOL 32831 0.0762 -0.0612 0.8133 
TC 32831 0.0447 0.0372 0.0283 
RISK 32831 5.7665 3.9116 6.6025 
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Table XIII. Regressions Analyzing the Effect of Ownership Structure on the Ex-Day Premium 
The sample is divided into two groups: high dividend yield stocks and non-high dividend yield 
stocks. Observations are sorted into three dividend yield quantiles. High dividend yield stocks consist 
of stocks in the highest dividend yield quantile and non-high yield dividend stocks consist of stocks 
in the other two dividend yield quantiles. The dependent variable is the ex-day premium. Following 
Michaely (1991), weighted least squares are used to correct for two sources of heteroskedasticity: the 
disturbance variance and the dividend yield. YIELD is measured as the amount of the dividend 
divided by the cum-day price. IND is defined as the number of shares held by individual investors 
divided by the total number of shares outstanding. HETERO is defined as the product of the number 
of shares held by individual investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding and the 
number of shares held by institutional investors divided by the total number of share outstanding. 
T2003 is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation falls in a year after 2003. TC
 (Transaction Cost) is measured by dividing one by the cum-day price. RISK is calculated by dividing 
the variance of a stock’s variance by the variance of the market returns during the estimation period 
[-45,-6] and [6,45].    
Panel A: Regressions Including IND and HETERO 
Non-High 
 Dividend Yield 
High  
Dividend Yield Full Sample 
Intercept  0.9857*** 0.7824*** 0.8288*** 
(10.89) (13.27) (20.70) 
YIELD 2.7047 1.7333*** 2.1477*** 
(0.20) (4.88) (7.02) 
IND -0.2183*** -0.1893*** -0.1906*** 
(-3.12) (-3.49) (-4.85) 
HETERO 0.3680** 1.1475*** 0.8761*** 
(2.51) (7.51) (8.65) 
T2003 -0.049 0.1232*** 0.0902*** 
(-1.19) (4.13) (4.00) 
TC -5.3797*** -3.7709*** -3.8584*** 
(-6.15) (-7.63) (-9.82) 
RISK -0.0041 -0.0034 -0.0056* 
(-0.78) (-0.83) (-1.84) 
Sample Size 21888 10943 32831 
F, (p-value) 14.22 45.47  63.28  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Adjusted-R2 0.0036   0.0238   0.0113 
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Table XIII-Continued 
Panel B: Regressions Including IND and IND2  
Non-High  
Dividend Yield 
High 
Dividend Yield Full Sample 
Intercept  0.9857*** 0.7824*** 0.8288*** 
(10.89) (13.27) (20.70) 
YIELD 2.7047 1.7333*** 2.1477*** 
(0.20) (4.88) (7.02) 
IND 0.1496 0.9582*** 0.6855*** 
(0.95) (5.49) (6.05) 
IND2 -0.3680** -1.1475*** -0.8761*** 
(-2.51) (-7.51) (-8.65) 
T2003 -0.049 0.1232*** 0.0902*** 
(-1.19) (4.13) (4.00) 
TC -5.3797*** -3.7709*** -3.8584*** 
(-6.15) (-7.63) (-9.82) 
RISK -0.0041 -0.0034 -0.0056* 
(-0.78) (-0.83) (-1.84) 
Sample Size 21888 10943 32831 
F, (p-value) 14.22 45.47  63.28  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Adjusted-R2 0.0036   0.0238   0.0113 
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Table XIV. Regressions with Interaction Terms between Ownership Structure and Other 
Factors Including the Dividend Yield and the 2003 Tax Cut  
The dependent variable is the ex-day premium. Following Michaely (1991), weighted least squares 
are used to correct for two sources of heteroskedasticity: the disturbance variance and the dividend 
yield. YIELD is measured as the amount of the dividend divided by the cum-day price. T2003 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation falls in a year after 2003. IND is defined as 
the number of shares held by individual investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
HETERO is defined as the product of the number of shares held by individual investors divided by 
the total number of shares outstanding and the number of shares held by institutional investors 
divided by the total number of share outstanding. TC
 
(Transaction Cost) is measured by dividing one 
by the cum-day price. RISK is calculated by dividing the variance of a stock’s variance by the 
variance of the market returns during the estimation period [-45,-6] and [6,45].  
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept  0.8272*** 0.8252*** 0.8760*** 
(20.27) (18.95) (22.85) 
YIELD 7.9145 
(2.46)** 
YIELD*T2003 -6.3443*** -17.06*** -11.31*** 
(-3.02) (-6.09) (-7.32) 
IND -0.1800*** -0.1958*** -0.1867*** 
(-4.57) (-4.96) (-4.75) 
HETERO 0.4917*** 
(3.49) 
HETERO*YIELD 40.8312*** 55.3561*** 65.6745*** 
(3.99) (6.53) (8.92) 
T2003 0.1609*** 0.2784*** 0.2173*** 
(4.98) (7.44) (7.77) 
TC -3.6378*** -3.8719*** -3.6974*** 
(-9.26) (-9.71) (-9.42) 
RISK -0.0058* -0.0071** -0.0068** 
(-1.92) (-2.36) (-2.24) 
Sample Size 32831 32831 32831 
F, (p-value) 55.22 54.33  62.37  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Adjusted-R2 0.0116   0.0112   0.0111 
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Table XV. Regressions Analyzing the Effect of the Ex-Day Excess Volume on the Ex-Day 
Premium  
The dependent variable is the ex-day premium. Following Michaely (1991), weighted least squares 
are used to correct for two sources of heteroskedasticity: the disturbance variance and the dividend 
yield. YIELD is measured as the amount of the dividend divided by the cum-day price. T2003 is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the observation falls in a year after 2003. IND is defined as 
the number of shares held by individual investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
EXVOL is defined as the difference between the average daily turnover (the ratio of shares traded to 
shares outstanding) during the 11-day event period [-5,5] and the average daily turnover during the 
80-day estimation period [-45,-6] and [6,45], divided by the average daily turnover during the 80-
day estimation period. TC
 
(Transaction Cost) is measured by dividing one by the cum-day price. 
RISK is calculated by dividing the variance of a stock’s variance by the variance of the market 
returns during the estimation period [-45,-6] and [6,45].  
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept  0.7318*** 0.9800*** 0.8299*** 
(17.06) (30.11) (19.07) 
YIELD 15.7311 19.2222 
(5.63) (6.86)*** 
YIELD*T2003 -15.4068*** -17.3979*** 
(-5.48) (-6.19) 
IND -0.3687*** -0.2415*** -0.2460*** 
(-9.84) (-6.18) (-6.30) 
EXVOL 0.0690*** 0.0706*** 0.0606 
(6.91) (7.27) (6.06) 
T2003 0.2803*** 0.1273*** 0.3003*** 
(7.49) (5.62) (7.95) 
TC -3.4303*** -4.3501*** 
(-9.29) (-11.15) 
RISK -0.0044 -0.0067** 
(-1.46) (-2.22) 
Sample Size 32831 32831 32831 
F, (p-value) 43.19 59.03  53.47  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Adjusted-R2 0.0064   0.0088   0.0111 
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Table XVI. Yield Spreads on Corporate Bonds 
This table reports mean and median yield spreads. We provide the breakdown by industry (Panel A), 
year (Pane B), rating (Panel C), and maturity (Panel D). Yield spreads are defined as the difference 
between the daily yield on the corporate bond and the constant maturity Treasury yield with the 
same time to maturity. To estimate the entire yield curve, we use a linear interpolation scheme from 
1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, and 30-year Treasury constant maturity rates. Following Campbell and Taksler 
(2003), we exclude the top and bottom 1% of yield spreads from our analysis. 
 Noncallable Bonds Callable Bonds 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Panel A: Breakdown by Industry 
Industrial 39,715 2.667 1.374 17,229 5.070 3.606 
Financial 89,947 2.123 0.997 68,788 3.366 2.007 
Utility 4,505 2.160 1.305 2,256 2.708 2.346 
Panel B: Breakdown by Year 
2003 10,519 0.937 0.762 540 3.608 2.733 
2004 15,228 0.868 0.685 2,988 2.202 1.726 
2005 25,801 1.405 0.776 12,886 2.813 1.962 
2006 25,525 1.395 0.827 18,161 2.344 1.453 
2007 20,956 1.586 1.147 19,407 2.216 1.611 
2008 17,857 4.716 3.163 16,685 5.244 3.229 
2009 18,281 5.158 3.313 17,606 6.089 3.552 
Panel C: Breakdown by Rating 
AAA-AA 33,774 1.392 0.865 27,116 1.859 1.501 
A-BBB 86,556 1.940 1.014 39,643 3.139 2.107 
BB-B 11,528 5.346 3.957 17,278 5.601 4.371 
CCC-D 2,309 13.046 9.208 4,236 12.608 9.937 
Panel D: Breakdown by Maturity 
2-7 years 99,043 2.165 0.946 24,170 6.314 4.186 
7-15 years 22,724 2.295 1.226 34,435 2.845 2.001 
>15 years 12,400 3.233 2.157 29,128 2.440 1.830 
Total 134,167 2.286 1.100 88,273 3.682 2.267 
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Table XVII. Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics on the bonds in our sample. Panel A provides summary 
statistics on noncallable bonds and Panel B provides summary statistics on callable bonds. Yield 
spread is defined as the difference between the daily yield on the corporate bond and the constant 
maturity Treasury yield with the same time to maturity. Following Campbell and Taksler (2003), we 
exclude the top and bottom 1% of yield spreads from our analysis.σ r is measured as the standard 
deviation of the daily one-month Treasury constant maturity rate for the 12 months prior to the bond 
transaction date. r is the one-month Treasury constant maturity rate. Slope is the difference between 
the 10-year and 1-year Treasury constant maturity rates. Rating is assigned a cardinalized S&P 
rating, where AAA=1, . . . , D=22. σ e is calculated as the standard deviation of daily excess returns 
over the CRSP value-weighted index using 252 daily returns prior to the bond transaction date. 
Liquidity is measured by dividing the number of days a bond traded for the 12 months prior to the 
bond transaction date by the number of business days during the corresponding period. Maturity is 
the bond’s remaining time to maturity in years and Coupon is the bond’s coupon rate in percent. 
Long-term debt to assets is measured by dividing long-term debt by total assets and operating 
income to sales is measured by dividing operating income before depreciation by net sales. 
 N Mean St.Dev. Min Median Max 
Panel A: Noncallable Bonds 
Spread 134,167 2.286 3.543 0.108 1.100 39.800 
σ r 134,167 0.495 0.292 0.053 0.529 1.281 
r 134,167 2.598 1.781 0.010 2.600 5.270 
Slope 134,167 1.203 1.215 -0.470 1.170 3.390 
Rating 134,167 6.396 3.451 1.000 6.000 22.000 
σ e 115,697 1.790 1.637 0.465 1.242 15.367 
Liquidity 87,940 0.507 0.339 0.004 0.474 1.000 
Maturity 134,167 6.072 6.554 1.000 3.967 92.282 
Coupon 134,167 5.942 1.611 0.940 5.875 16.500 
Long-Term Debt to 
Assets 104,282 0.225 0.162 0.000 0.187 1.554 
Operating Income to 
Sales 104,282 0.187 0.946 -9.518 0.259 5.139 
Panel B: Callable Bonds 
Spread 88,273 3.682 4.433 0.108 2.267 38.797 
σ r 88,273 0.559 0.306 0.053 0.550 1.281 
r 88,273 2.718 1.907 0.010 2.850 5.270 
Slope 88,273 1.070 1.208 -0.450 0.720 3.390 
Rating 88,273 7.124 4.954 1.000 6.000 22.000 
σ e 74,425 2.256 2.011 0.465 1.479 0.227 
Liquidity 59,422 0.306 0.243 0.004 0.229 1.000 
Maturity 88,273 12.422 7.088 1.003 11.389 87.285 
Coupon 88,273 6.179 1.336 0.250 5.850 14.000 
Long-Term Debt to 
Assets 66,888 0.276 0.216 0.000 0.283 1.555 
Operating Income to 
Sales 66,888 0.201 5.432 -421.436 0.269 5.139 
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Table XVIII. Regressions of Noncallable Corporate Yield Spreads on Explanatory Variables  
This table reports the pooled OLS regression results on noncallable bonds. The dependent variable is 
the yield spread. t-statistics based on robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported 
in parentheses below estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 
Intercept  -3.983*** 3.040*** 2.623*** 2.601*** 
(-4.84) (5.81) (4.99) (3.66) 
σ r 2.770*** 1.623*** 1.478*** 1.630*** 
 (7.36) (6.83) (8.34) (6.90) 
r  -1.2382*** -1.289*** -1.373*** 
 (-6.74) (-7.04) (-6.70) 
Slope  -1.763*** -1.707*** -1.765*** 
 (-6.21) (-6.99) (-6.22) 
Rating 0.293*** 0.339*** 0.331*** 0.329*** 
(4.93) (5.20) (4.79) (5.09) 
σ e 0.914*** 0.729*** 0.989*** 0.733*** 
(6.69) (4.73) (4.12) (4.78) 
Liquidity -0.188 -0.313* -0.408*** -0.307* 
 (-1.00) (-1.81) (-2.67) (-1.80) 
Maturity 0.005  0.002 0.003 
 (0.53)  (0.20) (0.35) 
Coupon 0.100**  0.020 0.063 
 (2.20)  (0.56) (1.41) 
Long-Term Debt 
to Assets 
1.106 1.148  1.214 
(1.16) (1.25)  (1.30) 
Operating Income 
to Sales 
-0.620*** -0.705***  -0.713*** 
(-5.46) (-6.27)  (-6.25) 
Industrial 0.465** 0.493** 0.378 0.507** 
 (2.04) (2.19) (1.54) (2.31) 
Financial 0.930*** 0.960*** 0.625** 1.043*** 
 (3.07) (3.17) (1.98) (3.33) 
Sample Size 64,875 64,875 75,742 64,875 
Adjusted-R2 0.5850  0.6130 0.5822 0.6136 
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Table XIX. Regressions for Different σ r and σ e Specifications and a Different Measure of 
Credit Ratings  
This table reports the pooled OLS regression results for different σ r and σ e specifications and a 
different measure of credit ratings. σ r and σ e are replaced with σ r*(Maturity)1/2 and 
σ e*(Maturity)1/2. Furthermore, we reverse the rating scale such that D=1, …, AAA=22 and take 
logs of all rating levels. The dependent variable is the yield spread. t-statistics based on robust 
standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses below estimated coefficients. 
*, **, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 
Intercept  12.175*** 23.609*** 22.177*** 21.660*** 
(9.67) (13.09) (16.54) (11.33) 
σ r*(Maturity)1/2 0.943*** 0.136*** 0.369*** 0.440*** 
 (7.34) (2.52) (5.86) (6.14) 
r  -1.990*** -1.643*** -1.718*** 
 (-7.02) (-8.55) (-6.98) 
Slope  -2.373*** -1.946*** -2.050*** 
 (-6.21) (-7.63) (-6.14) 
Rating -4.397*** -5.204*** -5.125*** -5.002*** 
(-13.22) (-17.33) (-16.45) (-15.39) 
σ e*(Maturity)1/2 0.279*** 0.119*** 0.290*** 0.180*** 
(7.92) (4.58) (3.25) (5.52) 
Liquidity -0.323** -0.512*** -0.666*** -0.508*** 
 (-2.06) (-3.76) (-5.82) (-3.82) 
Maturity -0.169***  -0.132*** -0.098*** 
 (-7.36)  (-3.34) (-5.42) 
Coupon 0.093  -0.015 0.043 
 (1.64)  (-0.24) (0.70) 
Long-Term Debt 
to Assets 
0.740 0.931  0.905 
(0.93) (1.27)  (1.20) 
Operating Income 
to Sales 
-0.961*** -1.102***  -1.017*** 
(-15.47) (-16.46)  (-16.05) 
Industrial 0.477** 0.426** 0.495* 0.525*** 
 (2.47) (2.19) (1.94) (2.96) 
Financial 1.046*** 1.229*** 0.806*** 1.155*** 
 (4.30) (5.44) (3.07) (4.94) 
Sample Size 64,875 64,875 75,742 64,875 
Adjusted-R2 0.5335  0.5799 0.5209 0.5932 
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Table XX. Regressions of Noncallable Corporate Yield Spreads for Different Time Periods 
and Different Credit Qualities 
This table reports the pooled OLS regression results on noncallable bonds. The dependent variable 
is the yield spread. t-statistics based on robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are 
reported in parentheses below estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Pre-Crisis Crisis Investment Grade Bonds Junk Bonds 
Intercept  -1.374*** 1.421 3.330*** 7.396** 
(-5.39) (1.42) (4.59) (2.03) 
σ r 0.958** 2.766*** 1.361*** 3.633*** 
(2.29) (4.89) (9.90) (2.94) 
r -0.049 -2.578*** -1.115*** -3.976*** 
(-0.75) (-7.07) (-8.55) (-5.74) 
Slope -0.021 -2.546*** -1.452*** -5.406*** 
(-0.40) (-6.54) (-6.49) (-4.44) 
Rating 0.196*** 0.612*** 0.140*** 0.524*** 
(3.77) (7.83) (3.94) (4.37) 
σ e 0.393*** 0.637*** 0.684*** 1.572*** 
(2.90) (3.20) (4.74) (6.13)  
Liquidity -0.144 -0.529** -0.485*** -0.088 
 (-1.57) (-2.08) (-3.56) (-0.25) 
Maturity 0.031*** -0.033 0.004 -0.002 
 (10.24) (-2.62) (0.51) (-0.08) 
Coupon 0.026 0.115 0.056 0.146* 
 (1.17) (0.98) (1.64) (1.77) 
Long-Term Debt 
to Assets 
0.989* 2.717 0.860 -1.706** 
(1.67) (1.59) (1.38) (-2.09) 
Operating Income 
to Sales 
-0.810 -0.730*** -0.650*** -0.155 
(-1.32) (-5.54) (-6.98) (-0.98) 
Industrial 0.206 1.474*** 0.216** 1.499* 
(relative to 
Utility) (1.40) (3.70) (1.97) (1.90) 
Financial 0.710** 2.362*** 0.506*** 3.007*** 
(relative to 
Utility) (2.46) (3.82)  (2.83)  (3.47)  
Sample Size 41,623 23,252 57,488 7,387 
Adjusted-R2 0.5185 0.6027  0.5983 0.6408 
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Table XXI. Regressions of Noncallable Corporate Yield Spreads with Fixed Effects  
This table reports the pooled OLS regression results on noncallable bonds. We include fixed 
effects for each firm and 6 year dummies. The dependent variable is the yield spread. t-statistics 
based on robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses below 
estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
1 2 3 
Intercept  3.440*** 4.355*** 3.800*** 
(4.76) (5.78) (3.37) 
σ r 1.565*** 1.683*** 1.743*** 
(6.50) (4.36) (4.39) 
r -1.417*** -1.616*** -1.641*** 
(-7.19) (-7.95) (-8.53) 
Slope -1.822*** -2.028*** -2.075*** 
(-6.48) (-7.03) (-7.32) 
Rating 0.440*** 0.315*** 0.452*** 
(5.81) (4.37) (5.71) 
σ e 0.736*** 0.785*** 0.760*** 
(4.47) (4.35) (3.43) 
Liquidity -0.483*** -0.205 -0.433*** 
 (-5.69) (-1.27) (-4.65) 
Maturity 0.002 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.26) (-0.54) (-0.22) 
Coupon 0.118*** 0.009 0.114*** 
 (2.89) (0.23) (2.79) 
Long-Term Debt to 
Assets 
-2.242 0.897 -2.206 
(-1.64) (0.95) (-1.42) 
Operating Income to 
Sales 
-0.574*** -0.681*** -0.577*** 
(-3.83) (-5.90) (-3.36) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies No Yes Yes 
Sample Size 64,875 64,875 64,875 
F-Statistic 7,118.64 474.89  7,758.78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
125 
 
Table XXII. Regressions of Changes in Noncallable Corporate Yield Spreads on Changes in 
Explanatory Variables  
We regress monthly changes in the yield spreads of noncallable bonds on monthly changes in σ r 
and monthly changes in other independent variables. We include fixed effects for each firm and 6 
year dummies.The dependent variable is the difference in yield spreads between two consecutive 
months. σ r is measured as the standard deviation of the daily one-month Treasury constant 
maturity rate for the one month, not the 12 months,  prior to the bond transaction date. r is the one-
month Treasury constant maturity rate. Slope is the difference between the 10-year and 1-year 
Treasury constant maturity rates. Rating is assigned a cardinalized S&P rating, where AAA=1, . . . , 
D=22.σ e is calculated as the standard deviation of daily excess returns over the CRSP value-
weighted index using one month daily returns, not 252 daily returns, prior to the bond 
transaction date. Liquidity is measured by dividing the number of days a bond traded for the one 
month, not the 12 months, prior to the bond transaction date by the number of business days during 
the corresponding period. ∆  denotes the first difference in each variable listed below. t-statistics 
based on robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses below 
estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.  
 
1 2 3 
Intercept  0.014** -0.303*** -0.306*** 
(2.03) (-15.77) (-4.43) 
∆ σ r 0.774*** 0.938*** 0.936*** 
(5.89) (14.54) (7.15) 
∆ r -0.287*** -0.192*** -0.192*** 
(-4.79) (-16.44) (-3.91) 
∆ Slope -0.232*** -0.147*** -0.146** 
(-3.20) (-4.83) (-2.11) 
∆ Rating 0.352 0.362*** 0.358 
(1.10) (5.77) (1.12) 
∆ σ e 0.196*** 0.187*** 0.188*** 
(4.34) (14.82) (4.20) 
∆ Liquidity -0.334*** -0.328*** -0.330*** 
 (-8.19) (-11.63) (-8.54) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies No Yes Yes 
Sample Size 82,338 82,338 82,338 
F-Statistic 15.95 186.34  33.41 
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Table XXIII. Regressions of Callable Corporate Yield Spreads on Explanatory Variables 
This table reports the pooled OLS regression results on callable bonds. We include fixed effects 
for each firm and 6 year dummies. The dependent variable is the yield spread. t-statistics based on 
robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients. *, **, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
1 2 3 
Intercept  6.226*** 10.806*** 7.319*** 
(4.74) (4.37) (3.99) 
σ r 1.270* 1.966** 1.981** 
(1.90) (2.49) (2.49) 
r -2.224*** -2.133*** -2.167*** 
(-5.07) (-5.05) (-5.22) 
Slope -2.618*** -2.722*** -2.799*** 
(-5.79) (-5.50) (-5.77) 
Rating 0.687** 0.455*** 0.683** 
(2.52) (4.25) (2.55) 
σ e 0.263 0.236 0.230 
(0.97) (1.00) (0.75) 
Liquidity -1.091 0.177 -1.026 
 (-1.46) (0.23) (-1.37) 
Maturity -0.061*** -0.076*** -0.061*** 
 (-5.46)  (-4.37) (-5.74) 
Coupon 0.344** -0.319* 0.326** 
 (2.23) (-1.67) (2.13) 
Long-Term Debt to 
Assets 
-3.519 0.734 -5.260 
(-0.75) (0.59) (-1.03) 
Operating Income to 
Sales 
0.019*** 0.006** 0.017*** 
(3.42) (2.18) (2.71) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies No Yes Yes 
Sample Size 42,959 42,959 42,959 
F-Statistic 20.99  33.20 37.85 
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Table XXIV. Interaction Effects for Callable Bonds 
This table reports the pooled OLS regression results on both noncallable and callable bonds. We use interaction 
terms between the determinants of call values and a callable dummy variable (Call) that takes the value 1 if the 
bond is callable. Junk is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the bond is a junk grade bond.  We also 
include fixed effects for each firm and 6 year dummies. The dependent variable is the yield spread. t-statistics 
based on robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses below estimated 
coefficients. *, **, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 1 2 3 4 
Intercept  4.225** 2.583** 5.513*** 4.332*** 
(2.43) (2.09) (4.75) (3.21) 
σ r 1.959*** 1.079*** 1.356*** 1.498*** 
(3.58) (4.64) (3.54) (4.20) 
r -1.810*** -1.286*** -1.406*** -1.445*** 
(-6.74) (-7.69) (-8.84) (-10.11) 
Slope -2.389*** -1.887*** -2.160*** -2.230*** 
(-7.22) (-6.12) (-6.38) (-6.88) 
Rating 0.647*** 0.565*** 0.294*** 0.568*** 
(3.92) (4.10) (3.58) (3.98) 
σ e 0.665** 0.906*** 1.017*** 0.925*** 
(2.23) (4.15) (3.62) (3.34) 
Liquidity -0.571*** -0.623*** -0.198 -0.572*** 
 (-3.09) (-4.82) (-0.98) (-3.79) 
Maturity -0.571*** -0.006 -0.009 -0.010 
 (-4.23) (-0.80) (-1.03) (-1.36) 
Coupon -0.036** 0.100*** -0.010 0.097*** 
 (2.36) (3.54) (-0.23) (3.91) 
Long-Term Debt to 
Assets 
-3.032 -2.529 0.549 -3.050 
(-0.93) (-1.02) (0.64) (-1.15) 
Operating Income to 
Sales 
-0.044 -0.019 -0.050 -0.022 
(-0.35) (-0.48) (-0.83) (-0.54) 
Junk*σ r  3.828*** 4.625*** 3.866*** 
  (3.34) (3.33) (3.31) 
Junk* r  -0.946*** -0.752*** -0.940*** 
  (-9.28) (-8.60) (-9.55) 
Call 0.523*** 3.939*** 6.516*** 3.212** 
 (2.64) (2.93) (2.97) (2.42) 
Call*σ r  -0.729*** -0.982*** -0.804** 
  (-2.96) (-3.01) (-2.55) 
Call* r  -0.735*** -0.655** -0.584** 
  (-2.60) (-2.22) (-2.01) 
Call*Slope  -0.980*** -0.616 -0.665* 
 
 (-2.79) (-1.64) (-1.71) 
Call*Rating  0.111** 0.132*** 0.112** 
  (2.21) (2.66) (2.31) 
Call*σ e  -0.550** -0.701** -0.559** 
  (-2.14) (-2.25) (-2.04) 
Call*Maturity  -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.042*** 
  (-3.67) (-2.64) (-3.83) 
Call* Coupon  0.183** -0.306 0.179** 
  (2.17) (-1.61) (2.11) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes 
Year Dummies Yes No Yes Yes 
Sample Size 107,834 107,834 107,834 107,834 
F-Statistic 51.10 157.47 97.86 180.43 
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Table XXV. Interaction Effects for High-Priced Callable Bonds 
This table reports the pooled OLS regression results on callable bonds. We use interaction terms between the 
determinants of call values and a high-priced dummy variable (HP) that takes the value 1 if the bond price is 
greater than 100. We also include fixed effects for each firm and 6 year dummies. The dependent variable is 
the yield spread. t-statistics based on robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in 
parentheses below estimated coefficients. *, **, and *** signify significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 Call Protection Period Callable Period 
Intercept  5.438*** 10.404** 
(4.31) (2.59) 
σ r 0.879** 3.256** 
(2.37) (2.49) 
r -1.262*** -2.598*** 
(-6.97) (-3.93) 
Slope -1.975*** -3.368*** 
(-4.92) (-4.18) 
Rating 0.003 1.218*** 
(0.02) (7.48) 
σ e 0.526*** 0.078 
(4.65) (0.22) 
Liquidity 0.167 -1.483 
 (1.26) (-1.24) 
Maturity -0.031*** -0.143*** 
 (-7.39) (-4.18) 
Coupon 0.242*** 0.822*** 
 (3.26) (3.94)  
Long-Term Debt to 
Assets 
-7.473* -37.580** 
(-1.74) (-2.50) 
Operating Income to 
Sales 
4.244 2.286 
(1.47) (0.80) 
HP*σ r -0.652*** -2.599** 
 (-2.96) (-2.26) 
HP* r 0.476*** 0.732 
 (3.67) (1.48) 
HP*Slope 0.980*** 1.036* 
 
(4.07) (1.79) 
HP*Rating -0.012 -0.252*** 
 (-0.92) (-3.19) 
HP*σ e -0.302*** -22.437* 
 (-5.43) (-1.74) 
HP*Maturity 0.003 0.012 
 (0.28) (0.23) 
HP* Coupon -0.297*** -0.147 
 (-2.72) (-0.63) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Year Dummies Yes Yes 
Sample Size 14,976 19,059 
F-Statistic 1,514.10 231.45 
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Figure I 
October 14 Announcement and Approval Date Announcement 
 
October 14 Announcement Effect  Approval Date Effect 
  Forced Banks Non-forced Banks  Non-forced Banks Only 
Voluntary (VB) 
versus 
 Involuntary (IVB) 
All non-forced banks 
that were eventually 
approved to issue TARP 
preferred stock 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Bank specific approval date  effect 
(subsequent to October 14) 
 
 
October 14 Effect   
 
   Forced Banks 
The U.S. Treasury forced nine large banks (forced banks) to issue TARP preferred 
stock on October 14.  Some forced banks were obviously more agreeable 
(voluntary, VB) to issuing TARP preferred while other forced banks were not as 
agreeable (involuntary, IVB).  We classify banks as VB or IVB based on existing 
preferred stock yield before October 14.  
 
 Non-forced banks 
Other banks were not forced to issue TARP preferred but became aware that they 
could apply to issue TARP preferred stock. 
 
Approval Date Effect (non-forced banks only) 
The U.S. Treasury permitted other banks (non-forced) to apply to issue TARP 
preferred stock after October 14.  Approval was announced by the government 
some time after application. If not approved, the government made no 
announcement and, furthermore, the public never knew if the bank applied for 
TARP.   All non-forced banks were voluntary. For non-forced banks, the impact 
of TARP preferred may be distributed across both the October 14 announcement 
and the bank specific approval date. 
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Figure II 
Trust Preferred Stock (TP) 
In order to create trust preferred stock, the issuing firm creates special purpose trust. The trust issues 
trust preferred stock to investors and lends the proceeds to the issuing firm. In return for the 
proceeds that the issuing firm borrows from the trust, the issuing firm issues junior subordinated 
debt to the trust. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firm 
 
Trust 
 
Investors 
Proceeds Buy 
Sell 
      Junior 
Subordinated   
       Debt 
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Figure III 
Representation of different windows for non-forced banks 
 
 
 
 
 -1 (Oct. 13)    0 (Oct. 14)                                                   Upon Approval                                                     
                                        
 
 
  
Window (-1,0) and Regression (1) 
 
(for both forced and non-forced) 
                                                                                 
                                                                                                 Approval Window and regression (2)                                                                                           
 
                                                                                                           (for non-forced only) 
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Figure IV. Time-Series Variations in Interest Rate Volatility and Yield Spreads 
This figure plots interest rate volatility and the mean yield spread of each month from 2003 to 2009. 
Interest rate volatility is measured as the standard deviation (in %) of the daily one-month Treasury 
constant maturity rate for the 12 months prior to the bond transaction date. Yield spreads are defined 
as the difference between the daily yield on the corporate bond and the constant maturity Treasury 
yield with the same time to maturity. To estimate the entire yield curve, we use a linear interpolation 
scheme from 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 20, and 30-year Treasury constant maturity rates. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
